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BEYOND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
PROTECTING BIDDER FIRM SHAREHOLDERS
FROM VALUE-REDUCING ACQUISITIONS
Ryan Houseal*
During the takeover transactions of the 1980s, bidder firms paid target firm
shareholders average premiums of approximately 50% for their shares. Did the
sizable premiums paid to target firm shareholders during the 1 980s reflect post-
takeover improvement in the target's performance? Or were the premiums a result
of the mismanagement of the bidder firms' assets?
The answer will help determine whether additional legal mechanisms should be es-
tablished to protect bidder firm shareholders from the threat of management's
consummation of value reducing acquisitions. Accordingly, this Note examines
various studies which attempt to identify the source of the premiums paid to target
firm shareholders. It concludes that additional protection for bidder firm share-
holders is not necessary. The studies examined fail to demonstrate that premiums
paid to target shareholders stem from mismanagement rather than from efficiency
gains. Moreover, adequate mechanisms already exist to protect the economic inter-
ests of bidder firm shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, the U.S. has experienced different
waves of mergers and acquisitions. During the 1960s and 197 0s, the
U.S. economy witnessed a spate of what are known as conglomerate
mergers.1 The conglomerate mergers involved acquirers purchasing
targets whose primary business purpose was unrelated to that of the
acquirers.2 In the 1980s, "corporate raiders" engaged in "bust-up
takeovers," where raiders acquired and split up the conglomerates
* Associate, Jones Day; B.A. 1999, City College of The City University of New York;
J.D. 2003, University of Michigan Law School. The views expressed in this Note are those of
the author and do not reflect the views ofJones Day. The author would like to thank Profes-
sor Richard W. Painter of the University of Illinois College of Law for his assistance in
preparing this Note for publication during his visit to the University of Michigan Law
School.
1. See R. GLENN HUBBARD & DARIUS PALIA, A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CONGLOMER-
ATE MERGER WAVE IN THE 1960s: AN INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS VIEW (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6539, 1998).
2. See Clas Bergstr6m et al., The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A Law and Econom-
ics Analysis of European Proposals for Reform, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 495, 499-500 (1995)
(stating that "[b]y 1974, firms that had no single, dominant line of business came to repre-
sent 20.7 percent of the firms in the Fortune 500, up from only 7.3 percent in 1959").
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put together during the 1960s and 1970s. Most recently, the 1990s
has experienced a wave of acquisitions where acquirers purchased
targets engaged in the same primary business as the acquirer; these
"related acquisitions" were attempts to consolidate major
industries. The past four decades of takeover activity caused much
debate and conflict. As managers of the conglomerates put
together in the 1960s and 1970s tried vigorously to defend against
the onslaught of corporate raiders, the propriety of defensive
tactics to defend against bust-up takeovers was called into
question.5 This debate, which took place both in legal academia
and the judiciary, focused mainly on protecting target company
shareholders from the abuse of target-company management in
the event that a takeover bid is made for the target firm.
The underlying reason for the concentration in this specific area
of corporate acquisitions is the existence of the "omnipresent spec-
ter" that the board of directors of a target company may act in its
own interests, as opposed to the interests of the shareholders, in
deciding whether to defend against or support a particular take-
over bid.6 Accordingly, the protection of target firm shareholders
has received much attention, while the interests of bidder firm
shareholders have largely been ignored. While academics have en-
gaged in an in-depth exploration of the hypothesis that bidder
firms overpay for targets, the idea that shareholders of bidder firms
require any additional protection from the actions of the bidder
firm managers, beyond that provided by the business judgment
rule, has received little attention.7 Although different explanations
have been put forth to explain this alleged overpayment by bidder-
firm management,8 many in the field of law and finance agree on
3. See ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, STOCK MARKET DRIVEN AcQuiSITIONS
I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8439, 2001), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w8439 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
4. Id.
5. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Moran V.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);.
6. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 946.
7. See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597
(1989) [hereinafter Bidder Overpayment]. Overpayment by a bidder in the context of a hostile
acquisition is said to occur when the costs of acquiring a target exceed the post-transaction
value of the target. See also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONs 294-95 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQuIsITIONS]; Miriam P. Hechler, Towards a More Balanced Treatment of Bidder
and Target Shareholders, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 319, 319 (1997).
8. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 623-29. Although Black admits that "in most
cases" a particular bidder's overpayment can be attributed to bad judgment by bidder
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the result of such overpayment: shareholders suffer economic
losses as evidenced by the decrease in the price of bidder-company
stock after the acquirer announces the acquisition. 9
The literature discussing the effects of corporate acquisitions on
bidder firm shareholders are exclusively dedicated to determining
whether such acquisitions actually create wealth for all sharehold-
ers involved in a transaction and society at large;' ° little, however,
has been written discussing whether bidder firm shareholders are
in need of additional protections. In her article, Towards a More
Balanced Treatment of Bidder and Target Shareholders, Miriam P.
Hechler puts forth an argument in favor of establishing legal
mechanisms to provide bidder company shareholders with addi-
tional protection from the "inappropriate" acts of bidder firm
management; these proposed legal mechanisms go beyond those
that currently exist under the business judgment rule." Although
the number of mergers and acquisitions has reached an eight-year
low,'12 the competition for market share among the firms of various
industries makes an increase in the level of mergers and acquisi-
tions very likely.'3 Accordingly, the discussion of what additional
legal protections should be provided for bidder company share-
holders is timely.
This Note will explain why the protections afforded bidder com-
pany shareholders by the business judgment rule are sufficient to
protect the economic interests of bidder company shareholders.
This Note argues that the additional legal mechanisms suggested
by Hechler are not only unnecessary, but will unduly hinder the
acquisition process at the expense of overall economic efficiency.
Part I begins by discussing the alleged problem: bidder overpay-
ment. Bernard Black's "overpayment hypothesis," which attributes
the high premiums that bidder companies pay to target company
shareholders to bidder overpayment will be discussed. Part I also
company management as to the quality of the deal in question, he nonetheless maintains
that "[m]uch of the theoretical basis for expected overpayment comes from divergence
between manager and shareholder interests." Id.
9. See id.
10. See PAUL ASQUITH ET AL., MERGER RETURNS AND THE FORM OF FINANCING (1987);
MARK L. MITCHELL & KENNETH LEHN, OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Do BAD BIDDERS BECOME GOOD TARGETS? (1988) [hereinafter OFFICE OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]; JOHN POUND, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERVICE, ARE TAKEOVER TARGETS UN-
DERVALUED? (1985); Baneijee & Owers, Wealth Reduction in White Knight Bids, FIN. MGMT,
Autumn 1992, at 48; Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7.
11. See Hechler, supra note 7.
12. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Expect A Return of the Urge to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2002, at 6.
13. See id.
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examines the harmful effects of bidder overpayment on bidder
company shareholders and concludes by calling into question the
evidence relied upon as proof that bidders do in fact overpay for
targets.
Part II of this Note will discuss the various explanations for why
bidder companies overpay for targets. Unwarranted optimism on
the part of bidder company managers, agency conflicts, as well as
the winner's curse theory will be discussed as possible explanations
for bidder overpayment. This Part ends by concluding that the rea-
sons given fail to adequately explain why a bidder would pay more
for a target than the target's true value.
Part III goes on to examine how the current legal regime pro-
tects bidder company shareholders from managerial decisions to
overpay for target companies. The business judgment rule will be
discussed and applied to the valuation methods commonly used by
company managers in deciding whether to acquire a target. This
Part attempts to show that based on the nature of corporate valua-
tion techniques, the business judgment rule adequately protects
bidder company shareholders from the harmful affects of over-
payment. Part III also discusses additional protections available to
bidder firm shareholders outside of the business judgment rule.
The efficacy of market mechanisms, federal securities laws and in-
terstate competition as protective devices will be examined. Finally,
Part IV will present, and discuss the shortcomings of, suggested
alternatives to the business judgment rule. This Part will argue that
the suggested alternatives will unnecessarily hinder the market for
corporate control by preventing acquisitions that increase effi-
ciency.
I. BIDDER OVERPAYMENT
A. The Overpayment Hypothesis
During the takeovers of the 1980s, acquiring corporations paid
target shareholders average premiums of about fifty percent; that
is, on average, shareholders of target corporations were paid a
price for their shares that was fifty percent above market value.
14
These takeovers, and the large premiums they produced for target
shareholders, gave rise to a "public controversy" over whether such
14. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 598.
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transactions were harming or helping the U.S. economy.15 Al-
though both sides of the takeover debate agreed that takeovers
benefited target company shareholders by offering high premiums,
proponents and opponents of takeovers disagreed "about the ex-
tent to which takeover premiums gauge the resulting efficiency
gains"'6 from the change in control. According to the critics, the
high premiums paid to target company shareholders come at the
expense of bidder company stakeholders (i.e. bondholders, em-
ployees and the local community). If the losses suffered by these
stakeholders are greater than target company shareholders' gains,
than takeovers actually destroy wealth. 7 If however, takeover advo-
cates are correct when they assert that the premiums paid to target
company shareholders "reflect the minimum amount by which the
discounted cash flows of target firms are expected to increase, typi-
cally by enhancement of the target firms' operating efficiency or a
restructuring of their financial claims," 8 then takeovers actually
create wealth. In short, the answer to the debate depends on iden-
tifying the source of value in takeover transactions.
The controversy over the social utility of takeovers has largely
revolved around a debate between financial economists and
industrial organization economists:9 with financial economists
arguing that the premiums paid in takeovers represent real
efficiency gains and industrial organization economists arguing
that takeovers produce no efficiency gains.20 In his article, Bidder
Overpayment in Takeovers, Bernard Black attempts to settle the
debate by developing the "overpayment hypothesis" as a partial
explanation for why the takeovers of the 1980s "produce[d] large
stock price gains for shareholders of target corporations ....2
15. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 1 ("Much of the public con-
troversy surrounding corporate takeovers ... concerns the economic rationale for these
transactions."); see also POUND, supra note 10.
16. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 6.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1-2.
19. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 598-99.
20. Id.
21. Id. Bernard Black explains the role of the overpayment hypothesis in explaining
premiums paid to target shareholders as follows:
The Overpayment Hypothesis is intended to be a partial, not a complete, account of
shareholder gains from takeovers .... [T]he Overpayment Hypothesis, the Free Cash
Flow Model, the Synergy Hypothesis, and other models will all play a part in explaining
the multifaceted phenomenon of takeovers. The Overpayment Hypothesis, however,
calls into question the extent to which shareholder gains imply increased efficiency.
Id. at 601.
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According to Black's hypothesis, target corporation shareholders'
gains were a result of acquiring corporations paying too much for
22targets.
An example of the overpayment hypothesis is illustrated in a
model constructed by Professor Black, which assumes an "artificial
one-period example, in which a bidder makes one and only one
acquisition."23 To demonstrate the phenomenon of bidder over-
payment, the model uses two profitable companies-"B1 (for
bidder) and TI (for target)"-both of which generate cash flow
that exceeds its positive net present value investment opportuni-
ties.24 The model also assumes that both firms have an asset value
of $50 per share.2 5 The model goes on to assume that BI acquires
TI for $60 per share (a 20% premium) . At this time, it is impor-
tant to point out two other assumptions, which are critical to the
soundness of the overpayment hypothesis and to the thesis of this
Note: (i) if B1 acquires T1, the acquisition will be purely "con-
glomerate" in nature; in other words, BI will not realize any
operating synergies or tax advantages from an acquisition of TI;
and (ii) if BI operates TI efficiently after the acquisition, Ti's
value will not increase above its asset value-$50 per share.' These
assumptions are necessary to the overpayment hypothesis, because
if post-acquisition operating synergies or tax benefits exist, or if
Bl's managers are able to operate T1 more efficiently, then TI may
actually be worth $60 per share to B1. Professor Black's model,
however, assumes that Ti's post-transaction value to BI will not ex-
ceed Ti's asset value of $50 per share, and accordingly, B1 has paid
$10 more per share than TI is actually worth. Without relaxing any
of the assumptions, which are critical to the soundness of Professor
Black's model, the acquisition just described would cause Bl's
shareholders to suffer losses in the form of a decrease in the price
22. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 614.
24. Id.
25. Professor Black's model also assumes that the market expects both firms to engage
in negative net present value projects as opposed to returning any excess cash flow to inves-
tors; because of this, the market discounts the price of both firms' shares by 20% of the asset
value to $40 per share. Id. This Part, however, ignores this assumption because it is not nec-
essary to demonstrate bidder overpayment.
26. In Professor Black's model, the premium is actually 50%. Although Ti's assets
would give TI a value of $50 per share, Professor Black's model assumes that the market
discounts this amount by 20%, because the market expects Ti's management to engage in
negative net present value projects-this results in a per share value of $40. Accordingly, in
an exact illustration of Professor Black's model, an acquisition of $60 per share would
amount to a 50% premium.
27. Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7.
[VOL. 37:1
Beyond the Business Judgment Rule
of BI's stock. What follows is a detailed discussion of the effects of
overpayment on bidder company shareholders.
B. The Effects of Bidder Overpayment
Finance literature has widely accepted the assertion that when
bidding firms overpay for targets, the value of the bidder firms'
stock will experience a loss in value. s In the model discussed in the
previous section, Professor Black argues that if a bidder company
were to overvalue a target and bid more than the target's true
value, the price of the bidder's stock would decline.29 Indeed, citing
studies that measure bidder returns during the 1970s and 1980s,
Professor Black posits that "[o]verpayment... will tend to produce
negative stock price reactions, on average."30 Other authors have
cited high-profile acquisitions as an illustration of the detrimental
affect that overpayment has on the bidder company's stock value.
Referring to Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.'s conglomerate acquisi-
tion of Celeron Oil in 1983 for $850 million,3' authors Mark
Mitchell and Kenneth Lehn explain that Goodyear's diversification
into the petroleum industry caused the price of Goodyear's stock
to experience abnormal declines in the amount of 14.83%; this
price drop translated in Goodyear shareholder losses in the
amount of $359 million.32 To these authors, the decrease in price
of Goodyear's stock and the accompanying losses suffered by
Goodyear's shareholders, "[are] consistent with the hypothesis that
the market believed that the acquisition would raise the combined
profits of Goodyear and Celeron, but that Goodyear simply over-
paid for the acquisition."
33
Bernard Black refers to the U.S. Steel acquisition of 1982 as an
illustration of the overpayment hypothesis and the effects of bidder
overpayment. 4 In 1982, U.S. Steel acquired Marathon Oil for $6.4
28. See Hechler, supra note 7, at 322 (arguing that by increasing their premium in or-
der to win an auction for a target company, bidding firms make it more likely that their
shareholders will suffer a loss in the value of their stock).
29. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 616. According to Professor Black's model,
the overpayment has to be unexpected to cause a drop in the bidder's stock price. As stated
above, if the market expects overpayment, then the market will discount the price of the
bidder's stock accordingly. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
30. Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 637.
31. See OFFICE OF ECONoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 4 n.4.
34. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 599.
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billion; the purchase price amounted to a 70% premium, or $2.5
billion over the target's pre-takeover market value. 5 Citing the ab-
sence of synergies between U.S. Steel and Marathon Oil, 6 as well as
the unlikelihood that the market undervalued the target, 7 Profes-
sor Black explains the high premiums paid to the target's
shareholders by concluding that U.S. Steel simply overpaid.38 In-
consistent, however, with Professor Black's overpayment hypothesis
is the fact that the market value of U.S. Steel's stock remained the
same after the acquisition: U.S. Steel's stock did not experience
any abnormal losses as a result of the acquisition. 39 According to
Black, however, no inconsistency exists. Black explains that the ab-
sence of any decrease in the price of U.S. Steel's stock does not
prove that U.S. Steel did not overpay for Marathon Oil; the ab-
sence of abnormal losses simply means that the market had
expected U.S. Steel to "reinvest its cash flow in the steel business,
where the returns were poor to nonexistent. In contrast, overpay-
ing for an oil company didn't look so bad."
This Note does not dispute the somewhat obvious and elemen-
tary conclusion that overpayment would cause bidder company
shareholders to suffer substantial economic losses. To a bidder, a
potential target is worth the net present value of the target's fore-
casted future cash flows. Accordingly, a "good" bid involves
purchasing a target at a price that makes the acquisition a "positive
net present value" investment, and a "bad" bid involves purchasing
a target at a price that makes the acquisition a "negative net pre-
sent value" investment. 4' Negative net present value investments
destroy firm value, while positive net present value investments in-
crease firm value.42 To demonstrate this concept, assume a bidder
company with the following balance sheet:
43
35. Id.
36. Synergies result when the acquiring company is able to manage the target more ef-
ficiently than the target's current management. See id. at 600.
37. See id. at 599 ("Misvaluation by the market was unlikely, because Marathon was a
fairly simple company whose chief asset was the Yates oil field, on which good data were
publicly available.").
38. Id. at 600.
39. Id. at 599.
40. Id. at 600.
41. See id. at 605.
42. Id.
43. This balance sheet is taken from STEWART c. MYERS & RICHARD A. BREALEY,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 444 (2003).
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HYPOTHETICAL BIDDER COMPANY'S BALANCE SHEET
(MARKET VALUES)
Cash ($1,000 held for investment) 1,000 0 Debt
Fixed assets 9,000 10,000 + NPV Equity
Investment opportunity/hostile
acquisition ($1,000 investment required) NPV"
Total asset value $10,000 + NPV $10,000 + NPV Value of Firm
This hypothetical balance sheet shows that the value of the bid-
der company's equity-its stock-is equal to the value of the
company. Moreover, because the value of the company is equal to
the value of the company's assets, plus the net present value of the
acquisition, we can see why taking on a negative net present value
investment would be harmful to bidder company's shareholders.
By acquiring a target with a negative net present value, "NPV" on
the balance sheet would be replaced by a negative number; this
would have the affect of decreasing the value of bidder company
and the bidder company's equity. Accordingly, this Note is not an
attempt to refute the obvious proposition that overpaying for a tar-
get-or acquiring a target with a negative net present value-is bad
for bidder company shareholders. This Note, however, does ques-
tion the evidence used to demonstrate bidder overpayment, as well
as the assertion that protective measures beyond the business
judgment rule are necessary to protect bidder company sharehold-
ers from bidder overpayment. The next part of this Note will
address the evidence used to demonstrate bidder overpayment.
C. Do Bidders Really Overpay? Evidence
Demonstrating Bidder Overpayment
Academics asserting that bidder firms overpay for targets rely
heavily on studies that employ the cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) methodology.45 The CAR methodology measures the stock
performance of an acquiring firm relative to the market as a whole
over a window period around the date that the acquisition is an-
nounced. Academics have often turned to event studies:
44. Where NPV equals the net present value of the target's forecasted future cash
flows.
45. See e.g., Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 602; see also HUBBARD & PALIA, supra
note 1, at 9 (explaining the positive abnormal returns earned by bidders in the 1960s).
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identifying when information about an acquisition is released and
observing how the stock price of the bidder company moves in re-
sponse to the announcement of the acquisition, to determine
when a firm has overpaid for a target.46 Supporters of the overpay-
ment hypothesis claim that the negative abnormal returns
experienced by bidder firms during a window period around the
date of the announcement of an acquisition prove that a bidder
has overpaid for a target. This Part attempts to show why event
studies are not completely reliable, and therefore, should not be
the basis for upsetting the current standard of review for manage-
rial decisions.
1. Cumulative Abnormal Return Methodology and the Efficient Capi-
tal Markets Hypothesis-This Note argues that altering the current
standard of review of managerial decisions to acquire a target
based on available event studies is problematic for several reasons.
First, in order for these event studies to have any probative value at
all, it must be assumed that the capital markets are efficient in the
semi-strong form;47 that is, the use of event studies assumes that the
price of a firm's stock represents an "unbiased estimate of the pre-
sent value of the firm's expected future cash flows, given a publicly
available information set."4 s Accordingly, if a firm overpays for a
46. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 185. See also
JOHN POUND, ARE TAKEOVERS REALLY UNDERVALUED: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET COMPANIES 4 (1985) (explaining that takeover
proponents rely on evidence that "generally involves the effects of takeover attempts on the
stock prices of firms, and hence on the wealth of shareholders").
47. Gilson and Black assert that the uses of event studies, "as a test of semistrong mar-
ket efficiency, and as a measure of the impact of new information[] are central to evaluating
the motives of acquisitions [and] understanding how acquisitions affect the value of particu-
lar firms. . ." THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 187.
48. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 19 (explaining that the event
study methodology, as a measure of the stock price effects of an acquisition, "is based on the
theory of efficient markets, which assumes that the price of any security incorporates all
currently available information and adjusts to the public release of new information instan-
taneously"); see also THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at
187. The efficient capital markets hypothesis posits that the prices of publicly traded stocks
should match the value assigned by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 135. In other words, after having
accepted the correctness of the value assigned to a publicly traded stock by CAPM, the Effi-
cient Capital Markets Model hypothesizes that publicly released information about the
issuer of that stock will cause traders in the market to assign a value to the stock that
matches the value assigned by CAPM. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH)
presents three forms of efficiency, which may lead to the stock prices matching their as-
signed value: (1) the weak form of ECMH claims that the market price of an issuer's stock
reflects the "past history of stock prices and stock trading;" (2) the semi-strong form of
ECMH states that "at any point in time, market prices are an unbiased forecast of future cash
flows that fully reflects all publicly available information"; and (3) the strong form, which "states
that market prices are an unbiased estimate of future cash flows that fully reflects all infor-
[VOL. 37:1
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target-if the price that a bidder pays for a target is more than the
discounted future cash flows of the target-the bidder's stock will
reflect this fact and the firm's stock will experience negative ab-
normal returns. Many in the academic world blindly accept the
notion that the capital markets operate in the semi-strong efficient
form. However, the cult following that the efficient capital markets
hypothesis has achieved does not mean that a time-tested legal re-
gime should be fundamentally altered based on its theories.
The very scholars that rely on the efficient capital markets
hypothesis to buttress their own arguments also recognize the
shortcomings of the theory. For example, Roger Dennis, who
attempts to demonstrate the utility of the efficient capital market
hypothesis in determining whether information is "material" for
purposes of Rule lOb-5 litigation, implicitly recognizes the flaws of
the model.49 Although the price of a firm's stock purportedly
represents the public's "unbiased" estimate of a firm's expected
cash flow, Dennis points out that individual investors may have
"different views of the significance of information. 5 0 However,
Dennis, like many other followers of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, dismisses this concern with the assertion that "market
mechanisms ... [will] combine[] these different perceptions of
the appropriate price and produce[] an equilibrium price that
equals the price that would prevail if all investors had access to
complete data and interpreted that data in the same manner.,,51
This is problematic, however, because Dennis assumes that
individual investor biases will be so heterogeneous that on
aggregate, these biases will push the price of a company's stock
toward the equilibrium price.'2 In reality, investor biases may be
just homogenous enough to push the price of a company's stock
above or below the equilibrium price. So while the price of an
acquirer's stock may rapidly reflect the reactions of the investing
public to a merger announcement, the reactions reflected may not
be an unbiased perception of the transaction. Accordingly, the
mation, both public and private." THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
supra note 7, at 135.
49. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 Wm. L. REv. 373 (1984).
50. Id. at 380. See also ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 1 (1989) ("Prices
change in substantial measure because the investing public en masse capriciously changes its
mind.").
51. Dennis, supra note 49, at 380.
52. Id. ("Individual investors may have biased perceptions, but the market averages
these variant views to form an unbiased estimate of the value of a security.").
53. According to Gilson and Kraakman, market efficiency depends "the equilibrium
that would result if everyone knew a quantity of information, and the equilibrium that is
FALL 20031
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cumulative abnormal return methodology's reliance on the
efficient capital market hypothesis makes the methodology
unreliable as a way to prove bidder overpayment.
2. Acquisitions, Acquisition Announcements, and Stock Price Move-
ments: Does a Causal Connection Exist?-The second problem with
the cumulative abnormal return methodology relates to how the
methodology determines the relationship between a firm's acquisi-
tion announcement and any subsequent movement in the price of
the firm's stock. The cumulative abnormal return methodology
attempts to determine what portion of the price movement of a
company's stock is attributable to the company's acquisition an-
nouncement. That portion of the price movement attributable to
the announcement is known as the abnormal returns.4 Generally
speaking, events that may have an effect on a stock's prices can be
categorized as systematic or unsystematic risk.5 Systematic risk repre-
sents the portion of risk that is due to market-wide factors-that is,
factors that affect the market as a whole.56 The remainder of the
risk is unsystematic or company specific; that is, the portion of the
risk that is due to factors specific to a particular company. An event
study is concerned with unsystematic risk, because the study at-
tempts to determine how an acquisition announcement, which is
company specific, affects the stock prices of the company making
the announcement.
57
In order to determine what portion of the price movement of a
company's stock is attributable to an acquisition announcement, it
is necessary to first determine the beta of that company's stock-
determining what portion of the price movement of a company's
stock is attributable to market-wide factors 8 To do this, a regres-
sion analysis is used. The regression analysis observes the past
actually observed," and the speed with which new information is reflected in price. Ronald
Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 558
(1984). Concerning the market's reaction to an acquisition announcement, efficiency may
exist in terms of how fast this information is impounded into the price of the issuer's stock,
but not in regard to how the investing public actually interprets the information. See THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 161 ( "Some shifts in inves-
tor demand for securities ... seem to be a response to changes in expectations or sentiment
that are not fullyjustified by information. Such changes can be a response to pseudo-signals
that investors believe convey information about future returns but that would not convey
such information in a fully rational model.").
54. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 194-95.
55. Id. at 94, 194. See also MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43, at 172-77.
56. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 94.
57. See id. at 194.
58. For a detailed discussion of beta as a measure of systematic risk, see infra note 187
and accompanying text.
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movement of a company's stock in relation to the market as a
whole and assigns the stock a beta. This beta informs us of the
stock's normal return-the amount by which the price of a com-
pany's stock would be expected to move in relation to the market. 9
Isolating the portion of the price movements of a company's stock
attributable to market-wide factors, also tells us that all other price
movements are attributable to company-specific factors.
This brings us to the next step in the CAR methodology. After
determining a stock's beta, or the portion of the price movement
attributable to market-wide factors, it is then necessary to assign
each company-specific factor its respective portion of the stock's
price movement. Using this methodology to determine the rela-
tionship between an acquisition announcement and a stock's price
movements poses two problems. First, as stated above, estimating a
stock's beta is not an exact science. The regression analysis meas-
ures the riskiness of the market as a whole as well as the riskiness of
a company's stock in relation to the market as a whole. Both
change over time. It seems unlikely that one is able to determine
exactly the current and future riskiness of the market and the
riskiness of a company's stock in relation to the market by simply
observing past movements and relationships. 60 Furthermore, in any
regression analysis the regression will be "noisy," which means that
even the historical estimate of a stock's beta may not be accurate.
6
If the beta of a company's stock cannot be accurately determined,
then one cannot definitively say what portion of a stock's price
movements is attributable to market-wide factors and what portion
is attributable to company-specific factors.
Any credible study attempting to show a causal relationship
between a certain company-specific event and the cumulative
abnormal returns that the stock of a firm experience must "reflect
any of the countless variables that might affect the stock price
performance of a single company. Statistical analyses must control for
relevant variables to permit reliable inferences.62 Therefore, the
methods of any study relying on the abnormal returns experienced
by the bidder firms' stock to prove the impropriety of a firm's
choice to acquire a target require careful examination. A study
59. For example, a stock with a beta of 2 would be expected to decline by 20% when
the market declines by 10%. Conversely, the stock would increase by 20% when the market
rises by 10%. There are a number of proxies that can be used for the market, such as the
S&P 500 index or large-company stocks.
60. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 115.
61. Id.
62. Akerman v. Oryx Comm., Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 343 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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must control for all other variables that may influence the
abnormal returns of a bidder firm's stock, so that one may reliably
say that the abnormal returns of said stock are causally connected
to the bidder firm's decision to acquire a particular target.
Event studies attempt to show a connection between a company-
specific announcement and abnormal returns. As stated above,
many academics assert that a company's announcement of an ac-
quisition where the price paid for the target is greater than the
target's value, will result in the acquirer's stock experiencing nega-
tive abnormal returns. 3 However, any uncertainty about the exact
nature of the causal connection between the bidder firm's acquisi-
tion announcement and the abnormal returns of a bidder firm's
stock should prevent us from relying on such studies in determin-
ing whether to provide bidder company shareholders with any
additional legal protection. Certainty about the relationship be-
tween an acquisition announcement and the abnormal returns of
the acquirer's stock can be increased by extending the time period
used to measure the relationship."' In other words, by extending
the period during which the price movements of a bidder's stock
are observed, event studies would provide a more precise measure
of the effect of an acquisition on a bidder company's value. In-
deed, "[o]ver limited time periods, high-risk assets may-and
sometimes will-produce lower returns than low-risk assets.",65
Bernard Black recognizes the importance of the length of the
event window used to measure the relationship between the acqui-
sition announcement and abnormal returns. In his article, Bidder
Overpayment in Takeovers, Black examines the results of different
event studies that observe the abnormal returns experienced by
stock of different bidder companies at different times surrounding
the announcement of an acquisition. The first set of event studies
examined by Black, which observe bidder returns from the bust-up
and horizontal takeovers of the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, use a
one to four day event window [-1, 4]. That is, these studies observe
the abnormal returns of bidder company stock during a period
starting one day prior to the announcement date of the acquisition
and ending four days after the announcement of the acquisition.
Studies using this event window showed that the bidder companies
63. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7; see also Hechler, supra note 7.
64. See ThE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 115
("Given actual patterns of asset price fluctuation, the time period needed to estimate the
relationship between risk and return is very long.").
65. Id.
66. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7.
[VOL. 37:1
Beyond the Business Judgment Rule
experienced negative loses on average. These studies, however, do
not resolve the dispute. While studies using the narrow event win-
dow of one to four days around the announcement date of the
acquisition did show bidders earning negative abnormal returns on
average, the second set of studies analyzed by Black, which observe
bidder returns over a wider event window [-11 to 41 days around
the announcement date], report only slightly negative returns. Fur-
ther, these negative returns are statistically significant for only one
day.
6 8
The difference in the results between studies using a narrow
event window and studies using a wider event window suggests that
the market may need more time to offer an unbiased perception of
the target's future cash flows under new management. Indeed, in
cases where the bidder's acquisition of a target is motivated by the
bidder's possession of nonpublic information about a target's true
value, potential gains from synergies between the bidder and the
target, or potential tax gains, the investing public may need more
time than provided by even the wider event window in order to
fully understand any potential increases in the future cash flows of
the target after the acquisition.
"Industrial organization studies" also call into question the con-
clusion that the negative abnormal returns experienced by bidder
company stock are demonstrative of bidder overpayment. 69 In fact,
Professor Black cites two such studies, which find that takeovers
result in actual productivity gains. In a study conducted by
Lichtenberg and Siegel, evidence is presented showing that the
plant productivity of the target's examined increased after the
change in control in the target's management resulting from the
takeover.70 A similar study conducted by Paulus and Gay "report[s]
that productivity growth in the 1980s was particularly strong in in-
dustries that experienced substantial takeover activity."7 The
findings reported by these two studies directly contradict the
67. Id.
68. Id. Black reports that both sets of studies, when "[t]aken as a whole, ... suggest
that since 1975, takeover bidders have earned at best a zero, and perhaps a slightly negative
net-of-market return." Id. at 602. When taking into account the positive abnormal returns
earned by targets, there is the possibility that society experiences a net social gain, because
the positive abnormal returns for targets are greater than the slight negative abnormal re-
turns of bidders.
69. Industrial organization studies measure the actual performance of the merged firms.
See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 605.
70. See id. at 606 (citing Lichtenberg & Siegel, Productivity and Changes in Ownership of
Manufacturing Plants, 3:1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON ACTIVITY 643 (1987)).
71. Id. at 606 (citingJ. PAULUS & R. GAY, Is AMERICA HELPING HERSELF: CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (1987)).
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overpayment hypothesis. Perhaps bidders paid target shareholders
such high premiums above the market price of the target com-
pany's stock because the bidder's management realized that the
target's incumbent management was wasteful and inefficient. It
would make perfect sense for a bidder, believing that a target's
cash flows could be increased under more efficient management,
to pay a premium for the target's shares, which reflect this in-
72
crease.
As the above discussion illustrates there is no consensus among
the legal academic community over the affects of a company's ac-
quisition announcement on the price of the company's stock. A
study conducted by Mark L. Mitchell and Kenneth Lehn observing
a sample of bidder companies reports that the average stock price
associated with acquisition announcements shows slight positive ab-
normal returns.73 Mitchell's sample consists of two types of
acquiring firms: acquirers that go on to become targets of hostile
acquisitions themselves, and acquirers that do not become tar-
gets.7 ' Examining the abnormal returns of these two types of
acquirers is informative. Mitchell reports that over a [-5, 1 ] window,
the stock prices of acquirers that go on to become targets decline
significantly-by 1.27%-as a result of the acquisition announce-
ment. The decline is greater-by 3.38%-when the window is
extended to a [-5, 40] window. The stock prices of acquirers that
did not go on to become targets, however, experienced significant
increases over the [-5, 1] and [-5, 40] window when they an-
nounced acquisitions-increases of 0.82% and 3.32%, respectively.
Besides contradicting the findings of negative abnormal returns
reported by other studies, the Mitchell and Lehn study demon-
strates something critical to the debate over the value of takeovers
and understanding the effects of bidder overpayment on bidder
72. See POUND, supra note 46, at 3. AsJohn Pound explains:
[Takeover advocates] argue that ... business combinations and mergers take place
because the acquiring firm can utilize the assets of the acquired firm more profitably
than can the target firm on its own, and that this potential for increased profitability
allows the acquiring firm to offer an above-market premium for the target.
Id.
73. Mitchell's study uses an event window of (-5, 1)-it measures the price affect of an
acquisition announcement over a period of 5 days before the announcements through I day
after the announcements-and reports positive abnormal returns of 0.14%. Mitchell also
observes the price effect over an event window of (-5, 40) and reports positive abnormal
returns of 0.70 percent for bidders. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become
Good Targets?, 98J. POL. ECON. 372, 375 (1990).
74. Id.
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company shareholders. Mitchell and Lehn show that even when
bidder company shareholders suffer as a result of a value-
destroying acquisition, they recapture the lost value of their equity
when their company becomes the target of a takeover. So in the
end, target shareholders suffer no real economic harm.
This Note does not argue that the numerous studies attempting
to measure the relationship between an acquisition announcement
and stock price movements have no validity or probative value as to
the profitability of an acquisition. This Note simply brings to the
reader's attention what other scholars have already pointed out,
, ,75
"that 'knowledge of the source of takeover gains still eludes us.
As such, studies reporting that bidders experience negative ab-
normal returns during a narrow event window around the
acquisition announcement are not conclusive evidence of the value
reducing affects of an acquisition, and should not persuade us that
the existing legal regime used to review managerial decisions is
inadequate. Indeed, subjecting corporate directors and officers to
some form of strict liability whenever an acquisition is made and
the company's stock experiences negative abnormal returns would
have a chilling effect on the market for corporate control and the
corporate decision making process. Such a rule would make cor-
porations, directors, and officers the insurers of stockholders.
D. Stock Price Movement as an Indicator of Transaction Value
Using the movement in the price of the bidder's stock to meas-
ure the value of an acquisition is problematic.76 Sole reliance on
the abnormal returns earned by the bidder's stock assumes that the
market value of the bidder's stock reflects the true value of the
bidder after the acquisition. Relying on abnormal returns as a sig-
nal of an acquisition's value is justifiable only if we assume that the
price of a bidder's stock reflects the investing public's unbiased
estimate of information regarding the acquisition." However, as
stated above, the investing public consists of individual investors
and these investors "may have incomplete data or ... different
75. Id. at 374.
76. See Bernard S. Black & Joseph A. Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Re-
structurings Between 1981 and 1986,J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Spring 1988, at 5, 6 ("Opponents
of takeover activity often criticize the focus on shareholder gains as narrow and excessively
dependent on the assumption that stock market profits accurately measure efficiency gains
in the economy.").
77. See Dennis, supra note 49, at 380.
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views of the significance of information."78 Further, the biases of
individual investors may be homogenous enough that the aggrega-
tion of these biases will not push the market price of the stock to
the equilibrium point.
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,71' the Delaware Supreme Court took ex-
ception with the defendant board of director's sole reliance on the
market price of its firm's shares in concluding that the premium
offered by a bidder reflected the true value of the firm. In finding
that such reliance was "clearly faulty" and "fallacious," the court
accepted the testimony of the defendants that the "the market had
consistently undervalued the worth of the [Company's] stock, de-
spite steady increases in the Company's operating income in the
seven years preceding the merger. ' s. Indeed, the parties to the dis-
pute took no exception with the court's finding that "a publicly-
traded stock price is solely a measure of the value of a minority po-
sition and, thus, market price represents only the value of a single
share."8' Accordingly, because Bernard Black's overpayment hy-
pothesis relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the market price of the
bidder's shares as evidence of overpayment, the existing standard
of review for managerial decisions should not be disturbed on the
basis of the hypothesis.8 2
78. Id.
79. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
80. Id. at 876.
81. Id. The court's view is consistent with the findings of Robert J. Shiller. In Market
Volatility, Shiller attempts to determine what controls the day-to-day price movements of
speculative assets such as stocks and bonds. Shiller concludes that the price movements of
these assets are in excess to the price movements predicted by the efficient capital markets
hypothesis. See SHILLER, supra note 50, at 2. Indeed, Shiller states that "fashions, or fads are
likely to be important or even the dominant cause of speculative asset price movements," Id.
at 41, and that "[pirices change in substantial measure because the investing public en
masse capriciously changes its mind." Id. at 1.
82. Literature attempting to measure the value created by corporate acquisitions
through the observation of indicia other than stock price gains does exist. Some academics
have attempted to determine the profitability of corporate acquisitions by observing "post-
acquisition performance." There is however, no consensus among the results reported from
these observations of post-acquisition performance. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPo-
RATE AcQuisITIONS, supra note 7, at 361-62 (summarizing the results of studies measuring
the profitability of corporate acquisitions by measuring post-acquisition performance). Ac-
cordingly, these studies are not demonstrative of the need to provide bidder firm
shareholders with additional legal protections.
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II. WHY ACQUIRING COMPANIES OVERPAY
In order to provide a better understanding of the overpayment
hypothesis, and to assist in this Note's efforts to determine if over-
payment is an accurate explanation for the premiums paid to
target shareholders, it is helpful to analyze potential reasons or
motives behind bidder overpayment. In a takeover market that al-
lows for competing bids, the appearance of a competitive bidder,
"will surely cause a bidder firm to raise the [tender offer] price"
that it initially made to target shareholders." In addition, a target
that provides a "lock-up" option to a white knight, or favored bid-
der, will cause a firm that makes a competing bid to pay more for
the target. 4 These circumstances, however, fail to explain why a
firm would pay more for a target than the target is actually worth.
Several explanations have been given to explain the phenomenon
of acquiring firms overpaying for a target; what follows is a brief
summary of each of the suggested explanations.
A. Manager Overvaluation of the Target Firm
This argument asserts that bidder company managers, in their
exuberance to increase profits and shareholder wealth, sometimes
overestimate a target's value.' Overvaluation of a target firm is said
to stem in part from the unwarranted optimism on the part of ac-
quiring firm managers:
86
[Optimism may cause a bidder to] err in assessing the attain-
able level of operating income as a percentage of sales, the
target's future sales growth rate, or the proper discount rate.
83. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 795.
84. Coates and Subramanian identify three types of lock-ups: (1) stock lock-ups, which
give a white knight a call option on a specified number of shares of the target at a strike
price agreed to by the target and the white knight; (2) asset lock-ups, which give the white
knight a call option on certain assets of the target-the target's crown jewels-at an agreed
upon price; and (3) breakup fees, which give the white knight a cash payment from the
target in the event that the transaction between the target and the white knight is not com-
pleted. John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and
Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 314 (2000). One example given by Coates and Subramanian
demonstrates that providing a favored bidder with a lock-up option (a break up fee) in a
competitive auction for a target will actually prevent an acquiring firm from overbidding. Id.
at 337.
85. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 624.
86. Id.
FALL 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
A manager who makes a relatively small error in any of these87
estimates can substantially overestimate a target's value .
It may seem intuitive that bidder firm shareholders should be af-
forded additional legal mechanisms to protect against overly
optimistic bidder firm management: unbridled optimism on the
part of corporate managers would result in the investment of a
firm's capital in assets that produce a return for shareholders lower
than the returns shareholders could earn on their own if they were
paid dividends and allowed to invest that capital on their own.
However, the threat of optimistic managers fails to provide a suffi-
cient reason for adopting a new legal regime. First, in a capital
market that is efficient in the semi-strong form, information about
the overly optimistic acquisition choices of a firm's managers will
be immediately reflected by the price of the firm's stock."" Accord-
ingly, "[investors] will discount the [firm's] stock price to reflect
the expected over-investment, and an overpriced takeover bid will
have a muted affect on the bidder's stock price. 8 9 In other words,
the market will protect all bidder shareholders from the threat of
overly optimistic manager behavior by ensuring that the price that
the bidder firm shareholder pays for her stock will be discounted
to reflect overly optimistic management. Second, there is no fully
acceptable or reliable method for determining whether a firm's
managers were overly optimistic in making their decision to ac-
87. Id.
88. SeeJAMES LORIE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES & EVIDENCE 70-73 (2d ed.
1985).
89. See Wieglos v. Commonwealth, 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that de-
fendants' unreasonable and inaccurate projections in an S-3 registration statement were
immaterial on the grounds that the market was sophisticated enough to discount manage-
ment's habitually optimistic forecasts). See also Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 624-25.
Under the efficient capital markets hypothesis, there are three levels of market efficiency,
that is, there are three types of information concerning a bidder firm, that can be reflected
by the market where that bidder firm's stock is traded. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPO-
RATE ACQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 135-37. See generally, BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 43,
at 351. At the first level, the current prices of a bidder firm's stock only reflect information
regarding the stock's prices in the past. This is the weak form of market efficiency. The sec-
ond level is known as the semi-strong level of efficiency. A market operating at the semi-
strong level of market efficiency reflects not just past prices, but all publicly available infor-
mation about the bidder firm. The price of a bidder firm's stock being traded in a semi-
strong efficient market will immediately adjust to public information (i.e. an announcement
by a firm of a tender offer). In the final level of market efficiency, the market for the bidder
firm's stock reflects all information, even that which is not available to the public. THE LAW
AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 135. The stock price of a bidder
firm in a semi-strong market would immediately reflect information about management
acquisition habits through the use of information made available to the public through
different ways-SEC disclosure rules and the media are two examples.
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quire a target. A determination that managers were overly optimis-
tic in assessing a particular target's post transaction value will be
made after the fact. Allowing courts that lack the business experi-
ence and expertise of seasoned managers to engage in this sort of
Monday night quarterbacking will cause mangers to be too risk
averse. Indeed, allowing courts with 20/20 hindsight to second
guess the informed decisions of a firm's managers will cause man-
agement to make business decisions that are borne more out of
caution and less out of certainty. Bidder firms' acquisitions will be
made more towards achieving the goal of avoiding liability under
this unduly restrictive legal regime, not towards the goal of increas-
ing shareholder wealth. Such a result will be bad for all
shareholders.
B. The Winner's Curse
Winner's curse theory posits that due to the uncertainty about
the value of a target, acquiring firm managers will overpay for tar-
gets on average. The existence of potential competitive bidders is
said to be enough to cause a bidding firm to increase its offer
above the true value of a target, when the target's value is uncer-
tain. "If the first bid is too low," potential competitive bidders will
make a higher offer.9°
Winner's curse theory as an explanation for bidder overpay-
ment, however, is problematic because the theory assumes that the
value of the asset is uncertain and that an auction for the asset ex-
ists.9 ' However, these conditions may not exist in the case of every
acquisition. Although it is possible for additional bids to occur af-
ter the initial bidder's offer,92 it is also possible for the initial bidder
to protect its expectancy interests in the transaction through the
use of what James Freund and Richard Easton call the "multistep
acquisition. 0 3 Although Freund and Easton analyze the efficacy of
the multistep acquisition in allowing friendly bidders to avoid
90. Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 625.
91. See id. Black asserts that "[t]he auction need not be explicit; it is enough that there
are potential bidders waiting in the wings to make a higher offer if the first bid is too low."
Id.
92. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 84, at 310-11.
93. SeeJames Freund & Richard Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679, 1680 (1979).
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competing bids for the same target, the acquisition technique can
be used to provide the hostile bidder with similar protection.!
The first stage of a multistep acquisition requires that the acquir-
ing company negotiate with a controlling shareholder of the target
company to purchase the shareholder's stock." If there is no con-
trolling shareholder, the acquiring company should negotiate a
stock purchase from a "large but noncontrolling [share]holder. 9 6
Similarly, the hostile bidder may also attempt to engage in negotia-
tions with an institutional investor for the purchase of a substantial
block of a target's shares. 7 If the hostile bidder cannot acquire a
block of shares from a large or institutional investor, the hostile
bidder may still prepare itself for its upcoming tender offer for the
target by acquiring a block of the target's shares through open-
market purchases...
94. Freund and Easton state that:
[The dichotomy] between negotiated (or 'friendly') acquisitions on the one hand,
and hostile takeovers on the other... has evolved into more of a continuum, with
the absolutely friendly deal (lacking even covert pressures) at one end of the spec-
trum; the absolutely unfriendly takeover (with no lines of communication open
between the parties) at the other; and most deals falling somewhere between the
poles, not uncommonly possessing characteristics of each.
Id.
95. Id. at 1683-84.
96. Id. at 1683.
97. Id.
98. See Frund & Easton, supra note 93, at 1684-85. Open market purchases of the tar-
get's stock by the hostile bidder may reduce any gains that the hostile bidder may realize
due to the resultant increase in the price of the target company's stock. See Gilson & Kraak-
man, supra note 53, at 570-572. However, any such reduction should be insignificant. Let us
assume that the bidder firm wishes to acquire the target because the bidder is in possession
of information that leads it to believe that the target is undervalued. Assume further that the
bidder has a monopoly on this information. "In these and similar instances of monopolistic
access, information first enters the market through a very small number of traders whose
own resources are not large enough to induce speedy price equilibration." See id. at 572.
A hostile bidder possessing a monopoly over information concerning the true value of an
undervalued target need only control the size and period over which it purchases a target's
shares in the open market in order to prevent the price of the target's shares from reflecting
the information held by the bidder. Furthermore, it is unlikely that "derivatively informed
trading ... [will] erode the [bidder's] advantage by capitalizing on the 'information leak-
age' associated with the trading itself." Id. at 572. "Indirect information leakage" through
"trade decoding"-uninformed traders gleaning by directly observing the transactions of
informed traders-will be unlikely to erode the bidder's advantage. This is because price
changes in stock through trade decoding are "especially pronounced when sellers are offi-
cers or other insiders of the issuer; moderate when sellers are investment companies and
mutual funds (which act on the advice of research staffs); and barely noticeable when sellers
are individuals, bank trust departments, and other traders who may liquidate their holding
for reasons other than investment gain." Id. at 573-74. The purchase of a target's shares in
the open market by a bidder who is not an insider of the target should not cause a drastic
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After the hostile bidder has acquired a key block of a target's
stock-either through carefully planned open-market purchases or
by purchasing from a large, institutional shareholder-the bidder
will then make a tender offer to all the target shareholders. The
tender offer will be made at the same price as was paid for the
block.""' In announcing its tender offer, the bidder will also make
known that "it has already purchased ... [a] key block" of the tar-
get's stock.'00 Usually the announcement of a tender offer by a
hostile bidder would bring "grey knights" into the fray,'0 ' which
would in turn obligate the target's board of directors to put the
target up for auction in order to obtain the highest possible price
for its shareholders. However, the appearance of "grey knights"
should be reduced as a result of the hostile bidder's purchase of a
block of the target's stock prior to the tender offer.
The bidder's ownership of a block of the target's stock, even a
minority of the target's stock, may create substantial problems and
costs for a grey knight that ultimately purchases the target.0 2 One
problem which may arise as a result of an unsuccessful hostile bid-
der's ownership of a block of a target's stock after the target is
purchased by a grey knight, is that the grey knight will be pre-
vented from gaining unfettered access to the target's assets:
0 3
If minority shareholders are not eliminated .... then whether
what is sought is the target company's existing cash, or the
proceeds of post-acquisition of sales of target company assets,
increase in the target's stock. Furthermore, "trade decoding remains limited by a significant
constraint: uninformed traders must be able to identify informed traders individually and
observe their trading activities directly." Id. at 574. Because it is unlikely that the investing
public will determine the identity of a bidder that makes small open market purchases of a
target's shares, the price increase of the target's shares should be minimal.
99. See Freund & Easton, supra note 93, at 1684.
100. See id. at 1683.
101. Id. at 1685. The appearance of "grey knights"-competing bidders "dripping with
cash or proffering attractive securities"-would trigger the "obligations of the target's board
of directors" under Revlon, which are to obtain the highest possible price for target share-
holders through the use of an auction. Id. at 1689; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that when a company's board of
directors authorizes its managers to negotiate a sale of the company, "the duty of the board
... [changes] from the preservation of ... [the company] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit").
102. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuIsITIONS, supra note 7, at 1237
("[I]t seems quite clear that acquiring companies, or at least those that counsel acquiring
companies, regard the flexibility to eliminate minority shareholders as crucial to their acqui-
sition planning.").
103. Id. at 1239 (stating that it is not uncommon for an acquiring company to be de-
pendent on access to target company assets in order to pay off the debt incurred to finance
the acquisition). See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
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the price of the acquiring company's access to those resources
is the distribution of a proportionate amount to any remain-
ing minority shareholders.
0 4
In order to gain access to the target's assets, the grey knight has
two options. The grey knight can cause the target to pay a
dividend, in which case the unsuccessful hostile bidder would
receive a proportion of the dividend paid. 10 5 Alternatively, the grey
knight could attempt to freeze out the unsuccessful hostile bidder,
by paying the hostile bidder a specified price for its shares. 0 6 In
either case, the result for the successful grey knight is the same: an
increase in the cost of the acquisition. Furthermore, because the
amount paid by the grey knight to freeze out the unsuccessful
hostile bidder will be at a premium, the unsuccessful hostile bidder
will most likely realize a gain.'0 7 In the end, the hostile bidder will
be able to launch an uncontested tender offer for the target or
realize gains from its minority block of target shares.
The final step of the multistep acquisition is the cash merger.108
At this point, the hostile bidder should own a sufficient number of
target shares to approve a freeze out merger of any remaining tar-
get company shareholders. In some cases, the hostile bidder may
be able to purchase enough of the target's stock through the first
two steps of the multistep acquisition to allow the hostile bidder to
merge with the target using a short-form merger.'O The multistep
acquisition technique results in the hostile bidder achieving 100%
ownership of the target. Furthermore, this acquisition method
eliminates much of the uncertainty surrounding the purchase
price and the successful completion of the acquisition of the tar-
get. Both benefits are realized due to the multistep acquisition's
104. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 1239.
105. See id.; see also Sinclair Oil Corp. 280 A.2d at 717 (holding that a parent that caused
its subsidiary to payout dividends in order to satisfy the parent's cash needs, did not breach
its fiduciary duty to its subsidiary where a proportionate share of the money was received by
minority shareholders of the subsidiary).
106. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITION, supra note 7, at 1240 (es-
timating the cost of securing a target company's cash through a freeze out merger).
107. Because many corporation statutes provide appraisal rights to minority sharehold-
ers that dissent to a freeze out merger, and because "the very notion of a freezeout requires
that the minority shareholders be paid off in cash," the grey knight will pay the hostile bid-
der a premium in a freeze out merger so long as the costs of a successful freeze out are less
than other methods of accessing the target's cash. See id. at 1253.
108. Freund & Easton, supra note 93, at 1680-95.
109. "The corporation statutes of most leading commercial states allow a majority
shareholder with a high enough ownership-Delaware and California for example require
90%-to approve a merger without a vote of the target company shareholders .. " THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 1253.
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ability to reduce the likelihood of a full-blown auction for the tar-
get. Accordingly, the winner's curse theory does not adequately
explain bidder overpayment."0
C. Agency Conflicts Between Bidder Firm
Management and Shareholders
One could also attribute overpayment to the divergence of the
interests of bidder firm managers and shareholders."' The connec-
tion between the shareholders and managers of a firm can be
defined as an agency relationship."2 Agency theory tells us that,
assuming that both shareholders and managers seek to maximize
their own utility, it is highly probable that managers will not always
act in the best interests of shareholders."13 Managers' interests di-
verge from shareholders' interests because of the position that
managers occupy in relation to the corporation and the capital
markets as a whole, as compared to shareholders. Furthermore,
efforts by shareholders are unlikely to prevent managers from act-
ing in their own best interests. Any efforts on the part of
shareholders to limit divergences from their interests will entail
monitoring costs.114 An individual shareholder owning a small per-
centage of a firm has very little incentive to incur these monitoring
costs, because the costs of monitoring the activities of managers
110. Freund & Easton state the popularity of the multistep acquisition has increased
due to "an era of intense competition for desirable acquisition candidates-where auctions
and bidding contests are very much the 'in' thing." Freund & Easton, supra note 93, at 1682.
111. Id. A discussion of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders is essential
to any argument for providing bidder firm shareholders with additional protection outside
the business judgment rule. While other explanations for overpayment depend on the igno-
rance of management, agency conflict implies some form of conscious wrongdoing on the
part of management. It was this "omnipresent specter" that management would act in its
own interest, as opposed to the interests of the finn's shareholders, that gave rise to the
heightened standard of review in Unocal. See Unocal, 493.A.2d at 954.
112. Jensen and Meckling define the agency relationship as "a contract under which
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to
the agent." Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavio,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). Bernard Black states
that it is inevitable that the interests of shareholders and managers diverge in some way. See
Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 625.
113. SeeJensen & Meckling, Theory of theFirm, supra note 112, at 308. The underlying as-
sumption of this argument-that the interests of the principal and agent, or in the case of a
corporation the shareholders and managers, diverge-is not necessarily clear.
114. See id.
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would far outweigh any gain that may be realized by the individual
shareholder."11
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders of acquir-
ing firms fall far short of justifying the adoption of a legal regime
beyond the business judgment rule to review the acquisition deci-
sions of management. As stated above, many believe that
shareholders are incapable of protecting their own interests due to
collective action problems. However, as shown in Part III of this
Note, the combination of a federal mandatory disclosure regime
and the presence of large and institutional shareholders address
most of the collective action problems. Institutional investors, be-
cause of their equity position in the acquirer and the decreased
cost of obtaining, analyzing, and verifying information brought
about by the mandatory disclosure regime, serve as adequate
monitors of managerial conduct.
Agency conflicts fail to provide an adequate justification for
moving beyond the business judgment rule for another reason.
Because two different types of investors can hold equity positions
in the acquirer, diversified and undiversified investors, one must
explore the different interests that exist among these different eq-
uity holders in order to determine the extent of any agency
conflict that may exist. An in-depth analysis of the distinct interests
of these two types of shareholders reveals that the conflict between
the interests of managers, which are aligned with the interests of
the corporation as an entity, and the interest of the corporation's
shareholders, is grossly over-exaggerated.
Diversified stockholders are not very concerned with firm-
specific risk."6 Accordingly a diversified stockholder will see a man-
ager's duty as "maximiz [ing] profits even at the risk of bankrupting
the firm.""' 7 So long as the actions of management produce ade-
quate returns, the diversified stockholder has little reason to
115. See id.
116. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diver-
sification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429, 430 (1998) [hereinafter Booth, Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bagholders] ("An internationally diversified portfolio can eliminate almost
ninety percent of firm specific risk."); see also Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor
Diversification, and Using Spread to Measure Risk, 54 Bus. LAW. 1599, 1607 (1999) [hereinafter
Booth, The Suitability Rule]. A diversified stockholder is indifferent to whether any specific
company in her portfolio takes on very risky projects--projects with a high expected return
on the firm's investment, but with the high probability that the actual returns will deviate
from the expected returns. See Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bagholder, supra, at 434
("A diversified investor will prefer that individual companies pursue high-return strategies
even if they entail high risk (because with diversification you win some and you lose some,
buy only the average matters).").
117. See Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders, supra note 116, at 430.
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concern herself with firm-specific risk. Maximizing short-term
stockholder wealth at the expense of the very existence of the firm
is antithetical to the interests of management and the corporation:
Ironically, management is the one constituency, which identi-
fies most with the fortunes of the corporation as an entity. A
diversified stockholder can afford to win some and lose some.
Management cannot. Management stands to lose the most if
the corporation fails. [M]anagement is not likely to pursue
the high-risk, high-return strategies ... [a]fter all, if such
strategies lead to the ruin of the company, it is management
that is left holding the bag.1
18
On the other hand, the interests of undiversified stockholders
mirror those of management. Similar to managers, the undiversi-
fled investor's interest is served by a management strategy that
"maximize [s] profits and ... minimize [s] risk.""9
An undiversified stockholder will likely prefer a merely ade-
quate return [a return that is in proportion to the low risk
involved] to a high return with high risk. Such an investor ca-
res very much about the survival of the firm.2 °
Accordingly, an analysis of the agency conflict between share-
holders and managers must begin with identifying the nature of
the acquirer's equity holders.12 1 Identifying the firm's equity
118. Id. Indeed, "[elven if management does not own a large percentage of the stock of
its company, it is likely to have a disproportionate percentage of its own wealth tied up in
company stock in the form of incentive stock options or similar stock price-based rewards."
Id. at 436.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Because it would be highly onerous at any given time for the board of directors of a
publicly-traded firm to attempt to determine what percentage of the firm's equity holders fall
into the diversified or undiversified category, it is unlikely that any given firm will know just
which type of shareholder interests are at stake. Furthermore, even if we assume that a firm's
equity holders consist of "rational" investors, and that a rational investor will diversify her port-
folio, it would still be unwise for management to make acquisition decisions based on the
preferences of these individuals. As Booth states:
[P] ractically speaking, managers cannot be expected to make business decisions on the
basis of what a diversified investor would prefer. For all management knows, there are
many different kinds of diversified investors out there following very different models in
making their diversified investment decisions. What one investor might prefer man-
agement to do (in light of that investor's particular portfolio) might differ radically
from what another investor might like to see.
Id. at 435.
FALL 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
holders becomes particularly important in the context of a firm's
managers' decision to acquire a particular target. If the acquiring
firm's stockholders are undiversified, management may be doing
what is exactly in the best interest of the acquiring firm's share-
holders.
A number of theories attempt to explain why bidder-firm man-
agement may engage in the acquisition of a target firm. 12 2 One
explanation is that managers "have a preference for maximizing
... stability, and may pursue ... diversification programs ... in
furtherance of this preference.'2" As shown above, by pursuing pro-
grams that promote stability and diversity, firm managers further
the interests of the firm's stockholders that are undiversified. If
courts go beyond the mandate of the business judgment rule and
prevent bidder firms from making acquisitions that would give the
bidder firm a diverse portfolio of holdings, undiversified stock-
holders in bidder firms may suffer.
24
122. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 84; see also Hechler, supra note 7, at 347-68.
123. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 84, at 354.
124. Consider a bidder firm faced with choosing from the two following, portfolios of
acquisition strategies to invest in. One of the most basic investment principles is that "the
more risk an investment carries, the more return it must offer to the investor." However,
through diversification, an investor can eliminate most of the unsystematic risk of a particu-
lar investment without sacrificing returns. Accordingly, if the shareholders of a firm faced
with choosing from among the following investment options are diversified, they would
prefer that the firm's management choose Investment B over Investment A.
INVESTMENT A
Estimated Probability of Expected Profit or Loss Value
Outcome
0.4 +6 2.4
0.4 +2 0.8
0.2 +1 0.2
1.0 3.4
INVESTMENT B
Estimated Probability of Expected Profit or Loss Value
Outcome
0.02 +150 3.0
0.2 -13 -2.6
0.2 -20 -2.0
0.32 -1.6
Indeed, in Joy v. North, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated "diversified
stockholders may prefer risky investments if they carry the prospect of greater return than
safer investments." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). But cf. MYERS & BREALEY,
supra note 43, at 177 (arguing that, although "[d]iversification is undoubtedly a good thing,
... that does not mean that firms should practice it. If investors were not able to hold a large
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Even if we were to assume that every equity holder in a bidder
firm is diversified, bidder firm management should make acquisi-
tion decisions as if it were serving the interests of undiversified
investors. An examination of the option grant as management
compensation illustrates this point. Option grants to corporate
managers are often used to align the interests of managers that
generally seek to diversify the corporation's portfolio, with the in-
terests of diversified shareholders.1 15 Providing management with
call options-the right to buy an issuer's stock at or before a given
expiration date at an agreed upon exercise price-management is
encouraged to take on investments with increased systematic risk 26
To understand why this is so, it is necessary that we understand the
nature of the call option. The call option gives an issuer's man-
agement the right to purchase the underlying asset-the issuer's
stock-on or before a certain date, at an agreed upon price. Man-
agement, however, is not obligated to purchase the issuer's stock.
Management will only exercise the call option if the value of the
127issuer's shares on the expiration date exceeds the exercise price.
If the market value of the issuer's stock is below the exercise price
on the day the option terminates, management will elect the op-
tion, and will experience neither gain nor loss. Therefore, as a
holder of a call option, management sees only the upside of the
option, but not the downside. Because investments with greater
systematic risk have a greater upside-higher expected returns-
than investments with less systematic risk, management will take on
investments with greater systematic risk to increase the value of its
call options.12 Accordingly, options encourage managers to make
acquisitions that serve the interests of diversified shareholders.
number of securities, then they might want firms to diversify for them. But investors can
diversify ... more easily than firms").
125. See Gretchen Morgenson, When Options Rise to Top, Guess Who Pays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2002, at 1.
126. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 240.
127. Id. at 233. If the value of the issuer's stock exceeds the exercise price of the option
on the date of termination, the holder of the option will purchase the issuer's stock from the
writer of the option at the exercise price and then sell the issuer's stock to someone in the
secondary market at the market price, which is greater than the exercise price.
128. Gilson and Black explain that "[a] central factor in valuing a [call] option is the
variance in value of the underlying asset. The greater the variance in the value of the underly-
ing asset, holding constant the value of the asset, the more the option is worth." THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 239. Investments with greater sys-
tematic risk also have a greater downside than investments with relatively less systematic risk.
As pointed out earlier, however, the holder of the call option is not concerned with the
downside of the option, because the holder merely elects not to exercise his rights if the
option is out of the money. MEYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43, at 579-81.
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However, this is not necessarily a good thing for shareholders.
One academic study conducted by two Rutgers University profes-
sors suggests that when managers behave too much like diversified
shareholders, all shareholders suffer. After observing stock op-
tion grants and shareholder returns at the 1,500 largest American
companies from 1962 to 2001, the professors report that compa-
nies that distributed "larger-than-average option grants to their top
five executives produced decidedly lower total returns to share-
holders over the period than those dispensing far fewer options."
3 0
Despite the fact that bidder firm management may engage in ac-
quisitions that actually serve the interests of bidder firm
shareholders-diversified and undiversified-the bidder firm
shares experience negative abnormal returns after it launches a
tender offer for a target firm.' l3 Those who argue that the con-
glomerate mergers of the 1960s and 1970s created inefficiencies, as
opposed to wealth, rely heavily on these negative returns to but-
tress their claims. However, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny
argue that the negative abnormal returns experienced by bidders
engaging in diversification mergers notwithstanding, the firm's
shareholders do benefit.3 2 argue that by "us[ing] their stock to di-
versify and to build conglomerates," managers advanced the
interests of long-term shareholders by raising these shareholders'
claims to long-term capital."3 The authors go on to state that:
Even though conglomerates do not appear to have increased
profits, and the long run stock market returns to the acquirers
have been negative, such [conglomerate] acquisitions were
still preferred to doing nothing .... [N]egative bidder re-
turns are not evidence of a failure to serve shareholder
interests-conglomerate values would have fallen even more
without [the acquisitions]. 34
129. Morgenson, supra note 125 ("'At the very least, options tended to promote a short-
term focus, and at the worst, they promoted fraudulent activity to manipulate.'"). But cf.
Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 638 (arguing that "[t]he poor returns from conglomer-
ate acquisitions[which reduce firm-specific risk]may explain why owner-controlled firms
tend to shun such acquisitions, despite their potential to diversify the owner's investment
portfolio").
130. See Morgenson, supra note 125.
131. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 640 (stating that on average, bidders "tend
to experience positive net-of-market returns in the period prior to a takeover announce-
ment and negative net-of-market returns in the post-announcement period").
132. See SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 3.
133. Id. at 20.
134. Id. (citations omitted).
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Shleifer and Vishny point out that the conglomerate mergers
also resulted in bidders realizing short-term gains. The authors
state that both acquirers and targets realized short-term gains due
to the "efficiency gains from conglomeration [which were] ob-
tained through better management."'33
Understanding the effect options have on managerial decision
making helps predict when and how managers can further the in-
terests of all shareholders with corporate acquisitions. Option
holders are in a position akin to that of diversified shareholders. As
shown above, managers that hold call options in an acquirer's
stock are affected by risk in very different ways than are holders of
the underlying security. 3 6 In corporate acquisitions, issuing call op-
tions to management encourage managers to acquire targets, even
though the expected return of the acquisition is insufficient to
compensate for the associated risk.
3
1
III. BIDDER PROTECTIONS UNDER THE CURRENT REGIME
A. The Business Judgment Rule
1. An Overview of the Business Judgment Rule-Bidder company
management wishing to engage in a hostile acquisition of a target
company need only comply with the business judgment rule in or-
der to fulfill its fiduciary obligation to its shareholders.38 Under
the Delaware Code, a corporation's board of directors is responsi-
ble for managing the business and affairs of the company.139
However, "[i] n exercising these powers, directors are charged with
an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corpora-
tion and to act at the best interests of its shareholders." 40 The
business judgment rule creates a rebuttable presumption that the
board of directors, in making a business decision, "act[s] on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
135. Id. Cf HUBBARD & PALIA, supra note 1 (stating that the abnormal returns earned
by bidding firms participating in the conglomerate acquisitions of the 1960s suggests that
the market rewarded diversification).
136. THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, SUpra note 7, at 242.
137. Id.
138. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858; see also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir. 1981); Hechler, supra note 7, at 322.
139. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (citing 8 Del. C.
141(a))
140. Id. (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
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action taken is in the best interest of the company.', 4' The party
attacking a board decision bears the burden at the outset to rebut
the business judgment rule's presumption.4 2 A plaintiff successfully
rebuts the presumption with a showing that, in approving a chal-
lenged transaction, a company's board of directors breached one
of the three prongs of its fiduciary duty: good faith, loyalty, or due
care. 4 3 What follows is a discussion of the due care prong of the
fiduciary duty obligation.
A plaintiff can rebut the presumption provided by the business
judgment rule by demonstrating that a firm's management has
breached its duty of care. In the context of making an acquisition,
a firm breaches its duty of care if the transaction lacked a proper
business purpose or the directors were not acting on an informed
basis. Hence, there are two options available to a plaintiff attempt-
ing to prove that a defendant firm has breached its duty of care by
making a particular acquisition: (1) plaintiff may demonstrate a
lack of substantive due care; 44 or (2) plaintiff may demonstrate a
lack of procedural due care. 4 5 This Note argues that due to the
methods that firms employ to value an investment decision, both
the substantive and procedural due care theories make it highly
probable that any acquisition choice that does not protect the in-
terests of the firm's shareholders will expose the firm's managers to
liability.
a. Lack of Substantive Due Care-A lack of substantive due care
on the part of a firm's board of directors may be found when the
board consummates a deal that is so bad that no reasonable direc-
tor could possibly have approved it. In other words, the deal had
no proper business purpose. 46 In Litwin v. Allen, a derivative action
brought by aggrieved shareholders against the Guarantee Trust
141. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)).
142. Id.. See also Cede & Co. 634 A.2d at 361.
143. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. For the purposes of this Note, only the due care
prong of a board's fiduciary duty will be addressed.
144. The substantive prong of the due care obligation requires a court to look to the
substance of a transaction; that is, the court scrutinizes the transaction in question to deter-
mine whether a rational business objective is furthered. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667
(N.Y. Sup. 1940); see also Panter, 646 F.2d at 298 (stating that the presumption afforded direc-
tors by the business judgment rule will be removed by showing a lack of a rational business
purpose); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating that a decision by a "loyal and informed
board will not be overturned by the courts unless it cannot be 'attributed to any rational
business purpose'").
145. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
146. See Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 667; see also Panter, 646 F.2d at 298.
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Company (GTC), the New York Supreme Court 47 found that the
GTC board of director's sale of certain securities lacked substantive
due care. Specifically, the court found liability on behalf of mem-
bers of GTC's board of directors, "because the entire arrangement
of [the purchase]' 48 was so improvident, so risky, so unusual and
unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental conceptions of pru-
dent banking practice." 5
Elaborating on the nature of the directors' breach of their duty
of care, the court emphasized that the "obligation, which the law
itself impose[d]" on the GTC directors required "more than hon-
esty." Directors were required to be diligent and that meant
exercising "care and prudence."' 50 According to the court's inter-
pretation, the GTC directors failed to fulfill their obligation
because the challenged transaction resulted in "any appreciation
... inur[ing] to the benefit of the seller and any loss ... be[ing]
borne by the bank[.]" J1 The court concluded its analysis of the
transaction by pointing out that "[t] here is more here than a ques-
tion of business judgment as to which men might well differ. The
directors plainly failed in this instance to bestow the care which the
situation demanded."
52
The business judgment rule's mandate that managerial decisions
be made with substantive due care buttresses the point that bidder
firm shareholders are in need of no additional protection. Accord-
ing to the court's holding in Litwin, where the economic benefits
of the transaction adhere to the target and the economic losses are
born by the acquirer, substantive due care is lacking. 153 This
147. In New York State, the trial court is designated as the Supreme Court, while the in-
termediate court of appeals and the court of last resort are designated as the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals respectively.
148. Although the court continuously referred to this particular transaction as a "sale"
of securities, the court recognized that the economic realities made the transaction a "loan."
The GTC directors gave the sellers of the securities a call option-an option to purchase the
securities from GTC within six months of the date of GTC's purchase at the price that GTC
paid for the securities. The court stated: "The fact is that the only purpose served by the option was
to make the transaction conform as closely as possible to a loan without the usual incidents of a loan
transaction." Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 692 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 699.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. This portion of the Litwin holding is particularly relevant to the thesis of this Note,
because it squarely deals with one of the major criticisms of corporate takeovers: That "the
[large premiums paid] to target shareholders ... reflect wealth transfers rather than im-
proved efficiency of the merged firms." See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 611; see also
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 10 (stating that "critics often argue that, al-
though takeovers benefit target stockholders, they often diminish the value of acquiring
firms").
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interpretation of the business judgment rule gives bidder firm
shareholders a cause of action against the firm's board of directors
where an acquisition is a mere wealth transfer from acquiring
shareholders to target shareholders.
5 4
b. Lack of Procedural Due Care-The mechanics of the procedural
due care test can be seen in the notable case Smith v. Van Gorkom'
5
While the substantive due care component of the business judg-
ment rule requires a reviewing court to examine the merits of a
particular transaction, the procedural due care component is con-
cerned with the process used by a firm's managers in selecting a
transaction. A plaintiff challenging the propriety of the decisions
of a firm's managers based on a lack of procedural due care must
demonstrate that a board's decision to acquire a target was unin-
formed.' 5
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court was faced
with determining whether a business decision of the board of di-
rectors of a target company was an informed decision under the
business judgment rule. 15' The court's answer turned on whether
154. Gilson and Black state that:
In its strongest form, the notion [of wealth transfers] is that the positive returns ex-
perienced by target shareholders simply represent a wealth transfer from acquiring
company shareholders to target company shareholders; target shareholder gains are
offset by acquiring shareholder losses.
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 635. Wealth transfers,
although producing significant gains for target shareholders, cause other stakeholders, such
as employees, holders of bonds and preferred stock of the bidder company, to suffer offset-
ting losses. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 611. The wealth transfer, however, does
not always result in acquiring shareholder losses being offset by target shareholder gains. As
Mitchell and Lehn explain, "[i]f the losses [are] sustained by [other stakeholders] .... cor-
porate takeovers actually destroy, not create, wealth." An acquisition resulting in such a
wealth transfer would violate the substantive due care prong of the business judgment rule
as interpreted by the Litwin court.
155. 488 A.2d 858 (1985).
156. Seeid. at872.
157. The Delaware Supreme Court explained the workings of the business judgment
rule as follows:
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental
principle, codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware
corporation are managed by or under its board of directors ... The business judg-
ment rule exists to promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power
granted to Delaware directors. The rule itself 'is a presumption that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the com-
pany.'
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prior to making a business decision, the directors have informed
themselves of all material information reasonably available to
them.' 58 Directors whose decisions are "unintelligent or unadvised"
are not afforded the rebuttable presumption provided under the
business judgment rule.5 9 Furthermore, directors, once informed,
are obligated to use the acquired information to protect the inter-
ests of their shareholders, whose financial interests the directors
represent.
1 60
As with a claim of lack of substantive due care, mere honesty or
good faith will not satisfy a director's obligation to act on an in-
formed basis; indeed, "considerations of motive are irrelevant
.. ,,16 Under the business judgment rule, "director liability is predi-
cated upon concepts of gross negligence.", 62 In other words, "the
concept of gross negligence ... is the proper standard for deter-
mining whether a business judgment reached by a board of
directors was an informed one.' 63
2. Bidder-Company Shareholders' Interests are Adequately Protected by
the Business Judgment Rule-The business judgment rule, as inter-
preted by Delaware courts, adequately protects the interests of
bidder-company shareholders. First, a company's board of direc-
tors is shielded by the business judgment rule's presumption only
when it acts in good faith; that is, "in the absence of fraud, bad
faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion, courts will not in-
terfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate
directors. "'" Therefore, in order to qualify for the presumption of
the business judgment rule, a board's business decisions must be
devoid of fraud, bad faith, and overreaching. This initial qualifica-
tion provides bidder firm shareholders with significant protection
under the business judgment rule. Although, this protective meas-
ure is incomplete, because it does not deal with actions by a board
of directors where the mental state does not rise to an intentional
level, both the substantive and procedural due care tests allow a
plaintiff to rebut the business judgment rule with a showing of
gross negligence.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
158. Id. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. ld. at 873.
162. Id. (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
163. Id. In Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, the Delaware Court of Chancery phrased
the question as "whether the board acted 'so far without information that they can be said to
have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment.'" 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933).
164. Panter, 646 E2d at 293.
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Whether the business judgment of a director a company's board
is an informed one turns on "whether the directors have informed
themselves 'prior to making a business decision, of all material in-
formation reasonably available to them.' ,,06 This test prevents the
managers of a bidding company from acquiring a target without
first informing itself in preparation for the acquisition. By "pro-
ceed [ing] with a critical eye in assessing information" relating to a
particular target prior to its decision to launch a tender offer, the
financial interests of the bidding company's shareholders are as-
sured adequate protection.
166
Even though it involved a suit brought by target company share-
holders, Smith v. Van Gorkom, clearly demonstrates that the business
judgment rule sufficiently protects bidder firm shareholders. In
Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court held that the board of directors' de-
cision to approve a merger did not qualify as an informed decision
under the business judgment rule. 16 ' The court found that due to
the board's lack of adequate "valuation information" concerning
its own company, the decision to approve the sale of the company
for $55 a share was not an informed one.18 Although Smith v. Van
Gorkom dealt with a board's decision to sell the company, the rea-
soning adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court is germane to
board decisions to purchase a target as well. A major factor in the
Delaware Court's determination in Van Gorkom was the board's ig-
norance as to the "intrinsic value of [its] company."6 9 The court
found that the board's reliance on the company's market price,
without any documentation, as a basis for selling the company at
$55 a share, made the board's decision an uninformed one."0
Elaborating, the court found that even though a major asset of the
company was its cash flow, "at no time did the Board call for a
valuation study taking into account that highly significant element
of the company's assets." 7' This rationale would apply with just as
much force to a board decision to acquire a target. A board's deci-
sion to buy a company without sufficient evidence concerning the
target's value would be no less a breach of the board's fiduciary
duty. The economic losses suffered by the company's shareholder
165. Van Gorkomn, 488 A.2d at 872 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124
(Del. Ch. 1971)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 875.
169. Id. at 874.
170. Id. at 875, 876.
171. Id. at 876.
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would be just as real; in fact, it stands to reason that shareholders
on the buy side of the transaction would suffer greater losses. Not-
withstanding the fact that the defendants in Van Gorkom may have
sold the company for an inadequate price, the shareholders still
would have received a premium of $17 above the market price.
Shareholders on the buy side of a transaction, however, receive no
172
such premium.
Applying the Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of the
business judgment rule in Van Gorkom to a company's decision to
acquire a target will ensure that, prior to any decision to launch a
tender offer for a particular target, the bidding company will fully
inform itself of all reasonably available information about the tar-
get. 73 Indeed, if the holding in Van Gorkom is strictly applied,
bidder company management is obligated to fully inform itself of
all reasonably available information on the value of the target.
Moreover, Van Gorkom requires that such information be used to
protect the interests of the bidder company's shareholders.
74
In illustrating the business judgment rule's efficacy in protecting
bidder company shareholders from value-reducing acquisitions, it
is helpful to apply the above legal analysis to a hypothetical firm
faced with the decision of whether to acquire a target. Assume a
hypothetical firm faced with the decision to invest in one of two
projects: Project A and Project B. The two investment options
available to the firm are: acquire a particular target, or expand its
existing business by opening up an additional branch office. Also
assume that this firm exists at a time when the rate of return on a
market portfolio (R)-an index fund-is twenty percent and the
rate of return on a risk-free security (R)-a ninety-day Treasury
bill-is eight percent. Further assume that both projects require a
cash pay out of one million dollars and both projects have an ex-
pected return of 1.8 million (eighteen percent). A firm faced with
such an investment decision will use the Net Present Value Method
(NPVM), in conjunction with the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), to determine which project to undertake. 17
172. See id. at 868.
173. Id. at 874.
174. See id.
175. The Net Present Value is a "discounted cash flow technique[] that reduce[s] fu-
ture cash receipts to present value in determining the value of the asset giving rise to the
payments."
176. The Capital Asset Pricing Model is a tool used to determine the relationship be-
tween the risk and return of a particular asset. For a discussion of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, see Franco Modigliani & Gerald Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts
and Evidence (Part II), FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1974, at 69-70.
FALL 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This hypothetical company will use these two valuation tech-
niques for the following reasons. First, the Net Present Value
accounts for the value of money. "A dollar today is worth more
than a dollar tomorrow"1 77 because of opportunity costs: tomorrow,
the opportunity to invest that dollar today and start earning interest
immediately is forgone. 17 This is relevant to a company's decision
to buy a target because when a company buys a target, it is paying
for a claim on the target's forecasted cash flows. These forecasted
cash flows, however, may not materialize until five, ten, or even
twenty years after the purchase date. Accordingly, the hypothetical
company must take into account the time value of money.
179
The Net Present Value method reduces future cash receipts to
present value.i s This allows an asset, the value of which depends on
future cash flows, to be valued today at a price that takes into ac-
count the foregone opportunity of investing those future cash
flows and start earning interest immediately. To begin using the
Net Present Value method, the acquiring company first forecasts
the cash flow to be generated by the target over the target's ex-
pected economic life.'8' The company would then apply the NPV
technique to discount the forecasted cash flows to its present value
so that the target's value, as determined by its future cash flow, re-
flects the opportunity cost of capital. However, before the company
can take this step, it must first determine the appropriate opportu-
nity cost of capital."2 To do this, the Capital Asset Pricing Model is
used. CAPM tells the hypothetical company how the target's price
should reflect certain types of risks-risks which may cause the tar-
get's cash flow to be different than expected. 8 3 In other words,
CAPM tells the company what the target's rate of return should be
based on the risk involved.
The first step for the company in calculating the opportunity
cost associated with each investment option would be to determine
the risk associated with each project, or the beta of each project, as
177. See MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43, at 93.
178. Id.
179. Id. ("Any investment rule which does not recognize the time value of money cannot
be sensible.").
180. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuisITIONS, supra note 7, at 76-77.
181. SeeMYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43, at 91.
182. Id. The opportunity costs of capital are what the company uses to discount the fu-
ture cash flow. See id.
183. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS, SUpra note 7, at 81-116
(discussing how risk affects the expected cash flow from a risky investment).
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represented by 13.184 This will enable the firm to determine what the
rate of return on each project should be. 185 Assume the market has
already determined that the systematic risk of the firm's current
operations is 13 = 0.8, and the firm's investment bankers conclude
that the expansion of the firm's existing business will also have a
beta of 0.8 (13 = beta of expansion project = 0.8). Based on this in-
formation, the firm would be able to determine what the rate of
return on the expansion project should be:
R,+ (R- R)13,
- 8+(20-8).8
= 17.6 (discount rate/market rate of return for expan-
sion project is equal to 17.6% or .176).s'
This tells us that if the firm's shareholders would be able to re-
ceive a 17.6% rate of return in the market if they put their money
in an investment with a beta of 0.8. This also tells us that the firm's
managers should undertake the expansion project, because it of-
fers a rate of return of 18% for a beta of 0.8, but the market will
offer only 17.6%.87
184. Gilson and Black explain that a firm is "subject to two qualitatively different types
of risk. Some risks are common to many firms ... though perhaps to differing degrees....
These risks affect the profits of all firms .. ." and are called systematic risk or market risk. THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 91. "Beta is a measure of
the systematic risk of a particular firm's stock, relative to the risk of the market as a whole." Id.
at 95. The other type of risk is company or industry specific, and is known as unsystematic risk
or unique risk. Id. at 91.
185. Determining the systematic risk associated with the target tells us what the target's
rate of return should be, because "assets with the same risk should have the same expected
rate of return. That is, the prices of assets in the capital markets should adjust until equiva-
lent risk assets have identical expected return." Id. at 91. See also MYERS & BREALEY, supra
note 43, at 196 (explaining that if investors are looking for a 9.2% return from an issuers
current business, then the cost of capital for a further investment in the same business is
9.2%).
186. As Myers and Brealey admit, "choosing a discount rate is seldom so easy." MYERS &
BREALEY, supra note 43, at 196. As Myers and Brealey do in their use of an expansion project
in a similar hypothetical this model assumes the expansion project has the same risk as the
company's existing business. The method described below for determining the beta of the
acquisition project will be different. See id.
187. According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the expected return on an invest-
ment should exceed the riskless rate of return by an amount, which is proportional to the
portfolio of the beta. In other words, if the market gives a rate of return of 8% for a risk-free
security with a beta of zero, and a rate of return of 20 percent on an investment with a beta of
1.0, then CAPM tells us that an investment with a beta of 0.8 should offer a rate of return of
17.6%:
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After determining the beta of the expansion project and the cost
of capital or discount rate for the project, the company is now
ready to apply the NPV method to discount the expansion project's
forecasted cash flow. If the net present value of the project is posi-
tive, then the project will increase shareholder wealth. To
determine the net present value of the project, we apply the follow-
ing formula:
ERe/(1 + .176) (where ERe is equal to the expected
return on the expansion project and 1.176 is the
discount rate)
= 1,800,000/1.176
= 1,530,612
The present value of the expected cash in flows of the expansion
project is 1,530,612 dollars. The firm would subtract the required
cash pay out from this amount:
1,530,612 
- 1,000,000
= 530,612
The expansion project has a positive net present value and will
increase shareholder wealth; therefore, management should un-
dertake the expansion project.'8
This, however, is not the end of the story. Although the expan-
sion project would increase shareholder wealth, it is still possible
for the acquisition project to be a more attractive investment op-
portunity. To determine this, the management applies the methods
used above to the acquisition project. Let us assume that after con-
ducting a regression analysis of the target's stock, the investment
BETA EXPECTED
RETURN
0.0 8
0.2 10.4
0.4 12.8
0.6 15.2
0.8 1.0
1.0 20.0
Investing in a project with a beta equal to 0.8 that did not offer a return equal to or greater
than 17.6 would expose the firm's managers to liability for breach of their fiduciary duty.
188. See MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43. This method can also be used to compare dif-
ferent investment decisions.
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bankers decide that the acquisition project has a beta of 1.2 (P. =
beta of acquisition project = 1.2). 's" The above valuation methods
determines whether the acquisition project is more desirable than
the expansion project. First, CAPM will be applied:
8 + 1.2(20 - 8)= 22.4where 8 (8%) is the rate of return on the
risk-free security, 1.2 is the beta of the acquisition project and 20
(20%) is the rate of return on the market, which has a beta of 1.0.
This number (22.4) represents the cost of capital for the acquisi-
tion project, or the discount rate for the future cash inflows of the
target, which in turn describes the present value of those cash in-
flows. This number also represents the rate of return that the
market would offer on an investment with a beta of 1.2. The acqui-
sition project should not be undertaken by the firm because the
rate of return on the acquisition project is a mere 18%, while the
firm's shareholders could invest in a security with a beta of 1.2 and
receive a rate of return of 22.4%. The Net Present Value method
also demonstrates the acquisition project's undesirability. Applying
the Net Present Value formula to the acquisition project reveals a
negative net present value of -$360,000. Accordingly, the acquisi-
tion project would result in a decrease in shareholder wealth and it
should not be undertaken by the firm's managers.
Although simplified, the above example does present a rough
approximation of the valuation method that is commonly used by
many firms to choose between competing investment options.
More importantly, however, it demonstrates how the business
judgment rule, as construed by Delaware and New York, will
adequately protect bidder company shareholders when firm
managers employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Net
Present Value method. If a board of directors decides to acquire a
particular target after being told that the acquisition has a negative
net present value, shareholders would have little difficulty in
showing that the board's decision lacked substantive due care.
Making an acquisition with a negative net present value is clearly
"contrary to the fundamental conceptions of prudent [business]
189. According to Gilson and Black, "[t]he best available way [to determine a com-
pany's beta] is to run a regression analysis...." THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
AcquISITIONS, supra note 7, at 94. The regression analysis observes the returns of the com-
pany's stock and treats those returns as dependant on return of the entire stock market.
That is, the return on a target's stock is a dependent variable that can be explained by (or is
dependent upon) factors that contribute to systematic risk. The regression analysis referred
to in this note uses just one contributing factor: the entire stock market. Id. See also MYERs &
BREALEY, supra note 43, at 224 ("An obvious way to measure the beta is to look at how its
price has responded in the past to market movements.").
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practices., ""Similarly, if management were to make an acquisition
with an expected return that, although positive, was lower than the
expected return that the market would pay for an investment
within the same risk class, shareholders would have a cause of
action under the business judgment rule based on a lack of
substantive due process.""
Consider another scenario, using the above example, where the
firm decides to make an acquisition that, while showing a positive
net present value, is made on the basis of grossly inadequate or in-
complete information.'1 9 Having failed to take advantage of "all
material information reasonably available to it, the board of direc-
tors of the firm would be exposed to potential liability based on a
lack of procedural due care.193 Indeed, under Van Gorkom's inter-
pretation of the business judgment rule, management of the
bidding company can be held personally liable if it does not fully
190. See Litwin, 25 N.Y2d at 699. It is not completely outside the realm of reason for a
firm to make an acquisition with a zero or negative net present value. As Myron Scholes
points out, stockholders of a firm with a high debt to equity ratio-a firm worth $100, with
outstanding debt with a face value of $90-have a strong incentive to engage in very risky
acquisitions that have a zero net present value. Myron Scholes, Options-Puts and Calls, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INVESTMENTS 559-78 (Marshall Blume & Jack Friedman eds., 1982) re-
printed in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 234-47.
However, negative net present value investments actually harm stockholders. Negative net
present value investments reduce firm value, as well as result in the company paying higher
interest rates on debt. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, supra note 7,
at 246; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
191. MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43, at 62 (stating that "at each point in time all secu-
rities in an equivalent risk class are priced to offer the same expected return ").
192. It is possible for a firm to value an acquisition through the use of CAPM but still
violate the procedural due care prong of the business judgement rule. For instance, deter-
mining a target's beta is a necessary step in the CAPM formula-it tells the acquirer what the
rate of return on the target should be. The beta of the target would be measured by observ-
ing how the price of the target's stock has responded in the past market movements. See
MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 43, at 224. This observation is known as a regression analysis.
THE LAW & FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 115. Although a regres-
sion analysis can describe the movements of a target's stock and the market, the analysis
does not explain why the movements occurred. "The event study technique does not elimi-
nate the need to assess cause through deductive reasoning; it only... helps delineate what
needs to be explained." THE LAW & FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at
221. Accordingly, constructing a regression analysis is only the first step in estimating a tar-
get's risk. Managers would be held to the business judgment rule's standard of procedural
due care in using the results of a regression analysis to determine a target's beta. Addition-
ally, managers must forecast the acquisition's future cash flows by using all material
information reasonably available to them at the time in order to comply with the procedural
due care requirement of the business judgment rule.
193. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
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investigate all available information relating to the target-
company's value."'
Such a case was indeed brought by aggrieved shareholders in
the Delaware Court of Chancery. In In re Cheyne Software, Inc. Share-
holders Litigation,95 shareholders alleged that management failed to
exercise due care when it rejected a tender offer for $27.50 a
share, at a time when Cheyne's stock was trading on the market at
$15 a share. 96 The tender offer of $27.50 a share, which proposed
to use the acquirer's stock as consideration, was "based on the pre-
vailing price of [the acquirer's] stock."197 However, management
determined that if the merger were to succeed, the price of the
acquirer's stock would be worth considerably less-$3.50 a share
less. 9 Management came to this conclusion by discounting the
post-merger cash flow of the acquirer to its present value. Share-
holders of the target alleged that management failed to exercise
due care because it did not question the discount rate used by the
investment bank it hired to value the acquirer's stock after the
merger."" The Delaware Court of Chancery framed the issue as
"[w]hether [the directors of the target] ... acted on an informed
basis."2 0 According to the court, the answer to this question de-
pended upon "'whether the directors ... informed themselves
"prior to making [the decision to reject the tender offer] of all ma-
terial information.' , 20' Although the court ultimately found that
defendants did not breach the duty of care owed to the sharehold-
ers,26 2 In re Cheyenne demonstrates that courts in fact do recognize
that managerial decisions concerning such matters as choosing
discount rates are subject to the business judgment rule's strict
standard of review.63
194. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 7, at 1054; see
also Trans Union Corp's Ex-directors to Settle Suit for $23.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1985, at
10 [hereinafter Ex-directors to Settle Suit].
195. 1996 WL 652765 (Del. Ch. 1996) (unpublished opinion).
196. Id. at *3.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at*7.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872).
202. The court found that the investment bank chosen by defendants to value the ac-
quirer's stock was "selected with reasonable care," and that the information presented by the
investment bank was within the bank's "expert competence." Id. at 7. The court further
found that defendants adequately considered the use of the twenty-one percent discount
rate "as well as the impact that different discount rates would have upon the [acquirer's]
share price." Id.
203. Although Cheyenne deals with management's decision to reject a tender offer, the
case demonstrates the general proposition that shareholder challenges to a board's selection
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While the business judgment rule provides bidder firm share-
holders with substantial protection, it does not give aggrieved
shareholders a cause of action in cases where the directors took
advantage of all material information and invested corporate funds
in a project that was both prudent and safe, but still suffered a loss.
This however, should not be the goal of the business judgment
rule, which "operates to bar courts from providing additional, and
unnecessary, constraints on management discretion through judi-
cial review of operating decisions.
2 0 4
In the end, truly overpaying for a target will expose a bidding-
company's board of directors to substantial monetary penalties
whether the plaintiff bases her claim on a lack of substantive or
procedural lack of care.5  Such penalties efficiently deter any
breach of fiduciary duties that bidder-company management owes
to shareholders. °6
of a discount rate-a choice that must be made in acquiring targets as well as selling the
company-will be recognized.
204. Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981). Gilson argues that because the various
markets-the product market and the market for managerial talent-provide managers with
non-legal incentives to avoid inefficient or self-dealing decisions, the "legal elements" of the
corporate structure should not provide "redundant controls." Id. Gilson believes that this
conclusion is true due to the current structure of the "typical corporate stat-
ute[which]assigns management responsibility to the board of directors. The business
judgment rule measures the discharge of that responsibility." Id. This framework prevents
the judiciary from imposing restraints on the decision making power through a corporate
statute that may duplicate restraints already imposed by the market.
205. In the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the settlement between the defendant board of
directors and the plaintiffs exceeded defendants' coverage under director and officer liabil-
ity insurance provided by the corporation by $13.5 million.
206. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1437, 1453 (1985). Professor Fischel asserts that the Delaware Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Smith v. Van Gorkom would result in all firms obtaining a fairness letter from an
investment banker before making a fundamental corporate change. Id. Professor Fischel's
somewhat cynical view of investment bankers as guns-for-hire notwithstanding, Smith v. Van
Gorkom will cause firms-both on the target and the acquiring side-to make decisions more
carefully.
Some would argue that the business judgment rule is of minimal benefit to bidder firm
shareholders in such situations. It is unlikely that the opportunity to apply the business
judgment rule will arise in a situation where a firm has decided to acquire a target that has a
negative net present value. It is more likely that a firm will be faced with two options: acquire
a target or distribute the funds that would have been used to acquire the target to bidder
firm shareholders. Ideally, the firm should devote funds to the project that maximizes
shareholder wealth. That is, a project undertaken by a firm should have a positive net present
value, and the project should not offer an expected return lower than the expected return
that the market would offer investments in the same risk class as the project. In the event
that shareholders allege that the firm's management overpaid for a target and breached its
fiduciary duty, management will most likely call in investment bankers to show that man-
agement is purchasing the target at a bargain price. In turn, attorneys for the shareholders
will respond by bringing in their own investment bankers who will show that management
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B. Other Protections For Bidder Shareholders
1. Mandatory Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws-Recent
academic literature has explored federal securities disclosure re-
quirements and their efficacy in enforcing fiduciary obligations to
bidder firm shareholders. °7 In his article, Required Disclosure and
Corporate Governance 8 Professor Merritt Fox analyzes the indirect
effect of the federal securities laws' mandatory disclosure regime
on corporate governance. He argues that mandatory disclosure
furthers shareholder participation in corporate governance by
"helping shareholders enforce management's fiduciary duties
209
and by "assist[ing] shareholders in effectively exercising their vot-
ing franchise."2 0
a. Disclosure and the Fiduciary Duties of Managers-Professor Fox
argues that without mandatory disclosure requirements, corporate
managers will not disclose the optimal level of information to their
shareholders. 21  As a result of the federal securities law's mandatory
disclosure system however, firms are required periodically to dis-
close information that would otherwise remain private. "Without
[this] information, it is often impossible for shareholders to know
about the potential breach."21 2 Professor Fox uses the example of
an "issuer transaction[] in which managers have an interest ' '213 to
demonstrate how mandatory disclosure rules assist shareholders in
preventing mangers from breaching their fiduciary duties. Profes-
sor Fox argues that:
has overpaid. The dispute may revolve around the proper discount rate. This game of duel-
ing investment bankers has played out in a number of Delaware cases where shareholders
have challenged management's use of tactics to defend against a hostile tender offer. See City
Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also Van Gorkom 488 A.2d
at 858; Cheyenne, 1996 WL 652765 (Del. Ch. 1996).
207. See Edward Rock, Securities Regulations as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 675, 678 (2002) (describing the mandatory disclo-
sure regime of the "SEC-system" as: "[being] divided between the Securities Act of 1933,...
which regulates issuance of securities, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ... which
imposes continuing and periodic reporting requirements in connection with the subsequent
trading of securities").
208. Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRORS. 113 (1999).
209. Id. at 118.
210. Id. at 116.
211. See id. at 118; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984);John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and
the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System 70 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984).
212. Fox, supra note 208, at 118.
213. Id.at119.
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Once the existence of a conflict-of-interest transaction is
known, shareholders can force management to satisfy its bur-
den of establishing the validity of the transaction. To do this,
management must show either that the taint of conflict has
been removed by appropriate procedures in the transaction's
authorization or, alternatively, that the terms of the transac-
tion are fairly clear to the issuer. Without shareholder
knowledge of such a transaction, the burden placed on man-
agement by corporate law is meaningless.2 4
This argument is equally convincing in the case of aggrieved
shareholders that decide to bring an action against a firm's man-
agers alleging that an acquisition, or series of acquisitions, amounts
to a breach of the managers' fiduciary duty. A plaintiff alleging a
breach of fiduciary duty based on a lack of substantive or proce-
dural due care will have to show that the transaction in question
was unreasonable or that the directors made their decision on an
uninformed basis. This requires that shareholders have access to
information regarding the merits of the transaction, as well as the
process used and information considered in assessing the value of
the acquisition. The mandatory disclosure regime of the federal
security laws provides bidder company shareholders with this in-
formation. For example, the Management Discussion and Analysis
section of the Securities and Exchange Commission's form 10-K, in
addition to form 10-Q requires management's analysis of current
financial operations and conditions.' These analyses amount to
more than just conclusory statements; they contain pages of de-
tailed information concerning the issuer's financial operations and
condition.1 6
214. Id.
215. Section 78m of the 1934 Exchange Act requires issuers that are registered with the
SEC under § 781 of the Exchange Act to file periodic reports with the SEC "as necessary or
appropriate for the proper protection of investors... ." With the enactment of the Exchange
Act, Congress gave the newly formed SEC the power to prescribe the form and content of
such periodic disclosures with the mandate that "such information and documents ... keep
reasonably current the information and documents required to be included in or filed with
an application or registration statement[,] ... [and] such annual reports ... certified... by
... independent public accountants, and such quarterly reports ... as the Commission may
prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994). See also id. § 78m(b) ("The Commission may pre-
scribe.., the form or forms in which the required information shall be set forth, [as well as]
the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and the earning statement..."). In
keeping with Congress' mandate, the SEC created periodic reporting obligations for cov-
ered issues in the form of current (Form 8-K), quarterly (Form 10-Q), and annual (Form 10-
K) reports. See 17 C.YR. 249.308, 249.308a and 249.310, respectively.
216. The forms used by issuers making periodic disclosures provide shareholders with
valuable information concerning the issuer's financial condition. This information enables
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b. Disclosure and the Shareholder Voting Franchise-The mandatory
disclosure regime of the federal securities laws also enables bidder
firm shareholders to better protect themselves through use of their
voting franchise.217 The information distributed to a firm's share-
holders through the mandatory disclosure regime results in "better
informed" shareholders, 11 who "are more likely to know whether
their interests favor retention or ouster of [incumbent manage-
ment] .,,29 Furthermore, Professor Fox argues that the collective
action problems normally experienced by a large group of dis-
persed shareholders that attempt to vote as a bloc would be
overcome by the existence of large, or institutional, shareholders
and the mandatory disclosure regime. ° Mandatory disclosure al-
lows large shareholders to obtain information concerning an issuer
at little to no cost. As a result:
Substantial positive externalities exist when a large share-
holder does receive information because the shareholder
likely will exercise its franchise in a way that will enhance the
interests of all shareholders. When these externalities are
added up, it becomes cost-justified for each shareholder to
receive the same amount of information from management as
the single owner would want. Required disclosure can be
seen, therefore, as a way of aggregating the demands of each
the issuer's shareholders to intelligently assess business decisions made by the issuer's board
of directors and to exercise their voting rights accordingly. For example, Items 301-305 of
Form 10-K (also known as the "management discussion and analysis" section) require issuers
to disclose " ' known events, trends or uncertainties, that are reasonably likely to impact the
company making the disclosure.'" See Martin H. Dozier, Barings's Ghost: Item 305 in SEC Regu-
lation S-K and "Market Risk" Disclosures of Financial Derivatives, 34 GA. L. REv. 1417, 1453-54
(2000). Item 303 obligates issuers to disclose any known information that may affect the
future liquidity, capital resources, or operating results of the issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
Of all the disclosure requirements, Form 8-K provides bidder company shareholders with
the most significant protection. It requires issuers to provide shareholders with information
concerning special events that take place between the required annual and quarterly report-
ing dates. Pursuant to § 17 C.F.R. 249.308, an issuer must file a special report with the SEC
for specific events, "such as bankruptcy, significant mergers or acquisitions, or a director's con-
troversial resignation." D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC's New Regulation FD
and its Impact on Market Participants, 77 IND. L.J. 551, 570 n.161 (2002) (emphasis added).
217. See Fox, supra note 208, at 116.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Collective action problems exist when the costs of seeking out information about a
corporation exceed the returns that even a large shareholder could expect to receive from
such efforts. Id. at 118.
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large shareholder for information to be provided to itself and
to other shareholders.2
The federal securities law's mandatory disclosure regime would
therefore allow bidder firm shareholders to use their voting fran-
chise to oust incumbent management who do not maximize
shareholder wealth. This safeguard, along with the others men-
tioned in this Note, provide a persuasive case against altering the
status quo to provide bidder firm shareholders with extraordinary
legal protections.
c. Federalism, Interstate Competition and Corporate Governance-
Principles of federalism and the resultant interstate competition,
also provide bidder firm shareholders with additional protection
from any inappropriate acquisition decisions. Due to interstate
competition, any particular state's standard of review for manage-
rial decision making will be set at the socially optimal level.
Jurisdictions in the U.S. compete among each other for the prize
of having corporations choose to incorporate within their bounda-
ries because:
The location of a firm can lead to the creation of jobs, and
thus to increases in wages and taxes-important benefits for a
state. As a result of this additional factor, competitive jurisdic-
tions will consider the potential benefits, in terms of inflows of
industrial activity, of setting standards [concerning the fiduci-
ary duties owed by a board of directors to a corporation's
shareholders] that are less stringent than those of other juris-
dictions, and, conversely, the potential costs, in terms of
221. Id. at 119. But cf Mark A. Sargent & Dennis R. Honabach, Proxy Regulation and the
Corporate Governance Debate, in PROXY RULES HANDBOOK § 1.1. Sargent and Honabach argue
that it is possible that the interests of institutional shareholders will not be aligned with the
interests of individual shareholders. They state:
It is far from clear that the interests of institutional shareholders are aligned with the
interests ofJohn and Jane Doe. Some critics of the institutional shareholder activism
question the underlying belief that institutional shareholders will continue to employ
activists strategies. They note that a number of different types of institutional share-
holders fall within the larger heading of 'institutional shareholder,' including
pension funds, mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, educational institutions,
religious orders and others. While public pension plans have been quite active, other
categories have been less so. Critics ... suggest that many institutional shareholders
will be compelled by the risk adverseness of their own investors to restrain from tak-
ing active roles in corporate governance.
Sargent & Honabach, supra.
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outflows of industrial activity, of setting more stringent stan-
dards.2
In other words, the standard of review used to assess a board's deci-
sion to acquire a target, will be such that the marginal benefits
from the standard of review will be equal to the marginal costs
(harms suffered by bidder company shareholders as a result of
bidder overpayment). As Richard Revesz demonstrates, "interstate
competition can be seen as competition among producers [the
states] of a good-the right to locate within the jurisdiction. 2 2 1
For example, let us assume a model consisting of two states-
State A and State B. Both states compete to attract the most corpo-
rations to incorporate within each state's respective borders in
order to reap the benefits described above. Assume further that
the residents of State A and B will be the only investors to invest in
any corporation that incorporates within the borders of the two
states. Now assume that each state's legislature has the choice of
establishing a standard of review for managerial decisions; the in-
trusiveness of the standard of review may from a level of 1 to 10, 1
being the least intrusive and 10 being the most intrusive. Finally,
assume that both the residents of State A and State B, as well as any
corporation, can move from one state to another without incurring
costs.
2 4
In such a competitive environment, the intrusiveness of the
standard of review chosen by each jurisdictions should be at the
socially optimal level. That is, the level of corporate-governance
laws that either state would enact for the protection of its respec-
tive residents should result in benefits that are equal to the harms
suffered by the investing public due to any breach of fiduciary duty
by a corporation's managers. If any one state imposes a standard
of review at a level of intrusiveness, which is above the optimal level,
that state will experience a loss of industry: corporations will mi-
grate to, or initially incorporate in the state that sets its laws at the
optimal or below the optimal level of corporate governance. On
the other hand, a state attempting to lure more corporations
within its borders by enacting a standard of review at a lower than
optimal level will experience two problems. First, residents will be-
gin to migrate to the state that has enacted a standard of review at
222. Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1215 (1992).
223. See id. at 1233.
224. This is an adaptation of the model used by Revesz. See id. at 1216.
225. See id. at 1238.
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the optimal level. Second, corporations will migrate due the rela-
tively small number of residents living in the state who can
contribute capital and labor to the corporation. Accordingly, com-
petition among the various state jurisdictions will produce the
socially optimal level of protection for bidder firm shareholders. 6
d. The Market for Corporate Control-The market for corporate
control also protects bidder firm shareholders from imprudent
and financially unsound acquisitions. 7 The imprudent or self-
dealing decisions of management will presumably cause a decrease
in the firm's profits.228 This decrease in the firm's profits "causes
the price of the corporation's stock to decline to a level consistent
with the corporation's reduced profitability."2 '9 According to Gil-
son, a decrease in the price of a firm's stock due to imprudent or
self-dealing management:
[C]reates an opportunity for entrepreneurial profit. If shares
representing control can be purchased at a price which, to-
gether with the associated transaction costs, is less than the
shares' value following displacement of existing management,
then everyone-other than the management to be dis-
placed-benefits from the transaction.
If one accepts the rationale underlying the theory of a corporate
control market, then one must also accept the proposition that
226. This model assumes that corporations, as well as citizens, consider State A to be an
adequate substitute for State B and vice versa. Whether the two states are adequate substi-
tutes is important in determining whether an increase in the strictness of any state's
corporate governance laws above the socially optimal level, will have the effect described
above. In other words, the response to an increase in the strictness of the state's corporate
governance laws depends on the elasticity of demand-the ratio of percentage change in
the quantity of the good demanded (in the above example, the right to locate within a state)
to the percentage change in price leading to the quantity change. For example, if State A
enacted corporate governance laws above the socially optimal level, and State B was an ade-
quate substitute for State A, then State A would experience a migration of the corporations
incorporated within its borders. This assumes, however, that corporate governance laws offer
the only opportunity for State A and State B to compete for corporations. Tax law and envi-
ronmental regulation, for example, present two more opportunities for competition among
the states. A corporation may choose to stay in State A , despite the fact that the corporate
governance laws are above the socially optimal level in State A, if the costs of State A's corpo-
rate governance laws are less than the cost that the corporation would incur from the tax
and/or environmental regulation of State B.
227. See Gilson, supra note 204, at 841 (stating that "it is now commonly acknowledged
that the market for corporate control is an important mechanism by which management's
discretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders may be constrained").
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 841-42.
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managers who make acquisitions for reasons other than maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth could not exist in such a market. As stated
earlier, the primary-if not sole-evidence used to demonstrate
that bidder firms overpay for targets is the negative cumulative ab-
normal returns experienced by the bidder firm's shares at different
points in time in relation to the imprudent purchase. If these
negative abnormal returns were truly the result of an imprudent or
self-dealing acquisition, then other firms in the market for corpo-
rate control would acquire the bidding firm. If, however, the
negative abnormal returns experienced by the bidder firm's shares
can be traced to some other cause, then the bidder firm's man-
agement will not be displaced by the market for corporate
control.23 ' Therefore, there can be but one result-inefficient or
self-dealing mangers will not exist where there is a market for cor-
porate control.232
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Requiring Bidder Firm Shareholder Approval ofAcquisitions
In order for a publicly traded firm to obtain the approval of a
group of dispersed shareholders, the bidder firm will have to en-
gage in a proxy solicitation. A firm attempting to acquire a target
through the use of a tender offer will naturally desire to prevent
the disclosure of its acquisition plans. 3 Requiring bidder firms to
first obtain the approval of its shareholders before making an ac-
quisition would decrease the likelihood that the acquisition would
231. In order for the market for corporate control to successfully displace inefficient or
self-dealing management, "[t]wo important conditions [must be satisfied].... First, the mar-
ket price of the corporation's stock must accurately reflect incumbent management's inefficiency or greed.
Second, there must be mechanisms available for displacing corporate management." Id. at
842 (emphasis added).
232. Richard Booth asserts that:
[I]nvestors seem clearly to prefer that management refrain from conglomerate diver-
sification over various lines of business as a way to smooth out income, presumably
because investors themselves can diversify their holdings virtually costlessly. The proof
is that stocks of conglomerate companies tend to trade at a discount from asset value,
making such companies attractive takeover targets because the pieces can be sold off
at a gain by the acquirer.
Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders, supra note 117, at 435-36.
233. See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982).
FALL 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
occur, or at the very least, would make acquisitions more costly to
the bidder firm. This increase in cost can occur for two reasons.
Assume that a bidding firm wishes to acquire a particular target
based on the belief that the target's shares are undervalued by the
market.2 34 If the news that the shares of this particular target are
undervalued were to reach the investing public, there would be an
upswing in the price of the target's shares. 5 Such an upswing
would make the target a much less attractive acquisition to the
bidding firm because it would decrease the profit that the bidding
firm could have realized had the information not been made pub-
lic.2
36
Secondly, as Coffee points out in his article, it is highly likely that
information concerning a bidding firm's plans to acquire a target
will be leaked to the investing public.237 Coffee argues that securi-
ties information, because it is a public good, displays the key
characteristic of non-excludability, meaning that the information
"seldom can be confined to a single user because many people
have a motive to leak it. '2 s Shareholders of the bidding firm, upon
learning of the upcoming acquisition of a target, will purchase
shares of the target in preparation for the upcoming acquisition.
However, the use and divulgence of the upcoming acquisition will
not stop there.
234. A target may be undervalued due to inefficiencies in the market. An inefficient
market is one in which "the prices of publicly traded common stocks do not correctly reflect
all information available to investors." See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPoRATE ACQUISI-
TIONS, supra note 7, at 135. Conversely, the use of the term "efficient market" refers to a
market that is efficient in the "semi-strong form," meaning that "at any point in time, market
prices are an unbiased forecast of future cash flows that fully reflects all publicly available informa-
tion." Id.
235. See Coffee, supra note 211, at 725.
236. Hechler, who advocates the use of the shareholder voting franchise to approve
corporate acquisitions, concedes that such a requirement would result in bidders paying
more for targets. She states that in order for to obtain shareholder approval for an acquisi-
tion:
Presumably, management would be expected to issue proxy statements providing in-
formation about the terms of the proposed acquisition. If... shareholders accepted
the deal, further complications would arise if another corporation offered the target
a higher bid. [If management is] forced to reissue proxy statements every time it
raises its bid ... [there will be] a significant increase in the cost of bidding and pre-
sumably a reduction in the number of bids.... [A]II bidders would be affected by the
voting rights mechanism. 'Good' bidders might abandon bids because of the added
expense of administering a potentially complicated voting process.
Hechler, supra note 7, at 381.
237. Coffee, supra note 211, at 725-26.
238. Id. at 725.
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"In fact, it [will] generally [be] in the [shareholder's] interest,
once he has traded, to inform others to create excitement and
induce a market upswing. Otherwise, the [shareholder]
achieves only the dubious victory of owning an undervalued
security, and as the Wall Street Traders' credo says: 'A bargain
that remains a bargain is no bargain.' ,239
Accordingly, making shareholder approval a pre-requisite to a
bidder firm's purchase of a target would most likely discourage
many acquisitions from taking place.2 40 This in turn decreases the
effectiveness of the market for corporate control, which would
leave inefficient managers in place to continue their inefficient use
241
of the target's resources.
One possible way to ease the conflict between the hostile bid-
der's desire for a speedy and silent takeover and the shareholders'
desire for an ex ante opportunity to vote for or against a hostile ac-
quisition is the internet voting mechanism suggested by Professor
Richard Painter.42 Although Professor Painter discusses the inter-
net voting mechanism as a way for target firm shareholders to
approve or veto management's use of defensive tactics, the same
voting method may be used to ease tensions between the managers
and shareholders of bidder firms. Painter's model would allow a
firm to proceed with its efforts to acquire a target, while providing
a forum in which shareholders can vote against the transaction. 243 If
a majority of the bidder firm's shareholders cast votes against the
transaction via the internet, then the firm management must cease
with its efforts to acquire the target.
44
Although Painter's internet voting mechanism is suitable for
enabling target firm shareholders to approve or disapprove man-
agement's use of defensive tactics, the model would be unworkable
239. Id. at 725-26.
240. In Hechler's proposal-which is to "require a supermajority ratification of all pro-
posed acquisitions"-many acquisitions that facilitate the market for corporate control will
be prevented, not merely discouraged. Id. at 380. Furthermore, requiring a supermajority vote
for all acquisitions would, in many cases, give institutional investors the sole power to pre-
vent an acquisition. Id. Where the gains to be realized by a transaction outweigh the loses
suffered by the disapproving institutional investor(s), and the institutional investor is al-
lowed to veto the transaction through the use of supermajority voting structure, socially
optimal transactions will be prevented.
241. See infra Part III.
242. See Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, European Takeover Law-Towards a
European Modified BusinessJudgment Rule for izkeover Law, 1 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 353, 382-
83 (2000).
243. Id. at 382.
244. Id.
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when employed to give bidder firm shareholders the opportunity
to approve or disapprove a firm's acquisition decision. First, unlike
a firm's decision to adopt defensive tactics, which usually consists
of an agreement between management and the firm's sharehold-
ers, a firm's efforts to acquire a target often involve payments to
and/or agreements with third parties.245 Furthermore, the delay
the bidder will experience while obtaining shareholder consent
would not be significantly less than the delay experienced through
the use of a proxy solicitation.246 When it comes to approving de-
fenses, Professor Painter is correct when he asserts that "[o]n-line
tallying of votes would be speedy because, instead of using record
ownership dates, a computer can invalidate a shareholder's vote as
of the date the shares are sold.",4 7 The process, however, would be
considerably slower in the case of hostile acquisitions. In order to
approve the propriety of an acquisition, a shareholder would have
to obtain, analyze, and verify all material information about the
transaction. These efforts are costly and time consuming.248 It is
possible for a hostile bidder employing the multistep acquisition
technique to have completed the first two steps of the process-
purchasing a block of the target's shares and announcing a tender
offer for the target-before enough shareholders analyze and ver-
ify all relevant information about the transaction and vote. It would
cause problems for the bidder if, after a successful tender offer for
the target's shares, the bidder learns that a majority of its share-
holders disapproved the transaction. Accordingly, a bidder firm
forced to seek the approval of its shareholders in this manner may
actually deter acquisitions that create efficiency and maximize
shareholder wealth.
245. See supra Part II(B) (discussing how the multi-step acquisition can decrease the un-
certainty of a hostile bidder successfully acquiring a target).
246. Hechler's advocacy of the shareholder voting franchise as a protective measure
stems from her proposition that if shareholders voted to ratify an acquisition that "later
proved to be financially destructive," shareholders would have the option of suing managers
based on the managers' use of false or misleading proxy statements. Hechler, however,
automatically assumes that if an acquisition turns out in the future to be unprofitable and
shareholders approved the acquisition, then the proxy statements used to solicit shareholder
approval of the acquisition must have contained false or misleading information. See
Hechler, supra note 7, at 388-89. This conclusion, however, is not warranted in many cases.
247. Kirchner & Painter, supra note 242, at 382-83.
248. The costs of obtaining the information may be zero, however, if the disclosure re-
quirements found under the SEC's proxy rules apply.
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B. Expanded Judicial Review
Another reform proposal suggested by Hechler is the applica-
tion of a heightened standard of review in cases where a
shareholder challenges management's acquisition decision(s).249
Hechler opines that the basis for the Delaware court's develop-
ment of the intermediate standard of scrutiny applied in Unocal-
the omnipresent threat that managers will, in defending against a
takeover, act in their own interests instead of the interests of
250shareholders -may apply to the same degree when managers ac-
quire a target.25'1 Before examining the specific proposals, this part
will first explore the underlying basis for Hechler's proposals-that
agency conflicts exist to the same degree for target acquisitions as
for defenses against a takeover bid. This Note argues that the po-
tential for manager/shareholder agency conflicts does not exist to
the same extent in the case of managerial acquisition decisions as it
does for managerial decisions to defend against a takeover bid.
To demonstrate this proposition, it is necessary to first examine
the different explanations for why management would act to fur-
ther its own interest, and not the shareholders, in deciding to
acquire a target. Bernard Black asserts that managers will act in
their own interests due to "[i]ncentives to increase size" and
"[i]ncentives to diversify the firm. '252 According to Black:
Incentives to increase size include managers' desire for
greater prestige and visibility, the desire of the chief executive
officer to leave a legacy and not be a mere caretaker, and
compensation structures that reward growth in sales and prof-
its. These incentives for growth may lead managers to
overinvest, either by expanding their own business or by buy-
ing a new business.2' 3
The threat that managers will disregard the interests of their
shareholders to fulfill desires for prestige and visibility cannot be
described as an "omnipresent specter." Black asserts that man-
agement would obtain the prestige and visibility it desires by
249. Hechler, supra note 7, at 383.
250. Unocal 493 A.2d at 946.
251. Hechler, supra note 7, at 383 (stating that "[l]ike the target managers in Unocal,
managers of acquiring firms often put their own interests before that of their sharehold-
ers").
252. Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 627.
253. Id. (citation omitted).
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over-investing-"expanding their own business or by buying a
new business." However, management would unlikely take such
actions due to restrictions imposed by the market for corporate
control.2 4 Mark Mitchell demonstrates this in a study where he ob-
serves the "stock price reactions" to acquisition announcements
made by two groups of firms-firms that subsequently became tar-
gets in takeover attempts and firms that did not receive a takeover
bid--during 1982-1986.2 5
Mitchell's study distinctly demonstrates the preventative effect
that the market for corporate control has on the likelihood of
management engaging in empire-building acquisitions. Mitchell
summarizes the result of his study as follows:
Estimates ... reveal that the probability of becoming a target
firm during 1982-1988 was significantly related to the stock
price effects associated with the announcement of acquisi-
tions made by the firms in our sample: the more negative
these effects, the higher the likelihood of a subsequent take-
over. The probability of becoming a hostile ... target is
especially related to these stock price effects."6
The implications of Mitchell's findings for the assertion that the
market for corporate control makes empire-building acquisitions
unlikely are two-fold. First, if firms that make acquisition decisions
based on prestige or visibility become takeover targets in the end,
shareholders that experienced a stock decrease due to manage-
ment's imprudent acquisition decisions will recover those loses by
receiving a premium for their shares from a subsequent hostile
25bidder. Second, Mitchell's study demonstrates that there are
"good" and "bad" bidders. One should not lose sight of the dan-
gers of modifying the current standard used for reviewing
managerial decisions to acquire a target: such modification may
have a chilling effect on the managers of both good and bad ac-
quirers, which will in turn result in a less effective market for
corporate control . 5
254. See supra Part I(C).
255. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 5.
256. Id.
257. See id. Because of the Delaware Supreme Court's mandate in Revlon, which requires
a firm's board of directors to obtain the highest possible price for the firm's shareholders,
shareholders are almost assured of recovering any economic loss they suffered due to the
actions of incumbent management. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
258. See supra Part I(C).
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The threat that managers will put their interests before those of
shareholders by diversifying the firm's portfolio, also falls far short
of an ubiquitous threat. First, the possibility that risk averse man-
agers will over-invest by buying a new business can be dealt with
through the use of ex ante agreements between management and
shareholders. By offering its managers options, a firm can make
managers less risk averse and thereby lessen the likelihood that
managers will acquire new businesses to diversify the firm's portfo-
lio.25 9 Dealing with risk averse managers ex ante is preferable to
litigation that would be drawn out, costly and harmful to the
firm-even if such litigation takes place under a modified business
judgment rule. Second, the market for corporate control suffi-
ciently deters managers from any harmful diversification of the
firm's portfolio. Mitchell asserts that the hostile takeovers during
the mid-1980s demonstrated how the market for corporate control
eliminated firms that made unwise acquisitions-conglomerate
mergers-during the 1970s and early 1980s. He states:
Generally, the evidence reviewed above pertains to takeovers
during the 1970s and early 1980s. A unique feature of hostile
takeovers during this period is that many of these transactions
were motivated by the acquiring firms' desire to sell a substan-
tial portion of the target firms' assets. To the extent that these
'bust-up' takeovers prune target firms of 'poorly' performing
assets which the target firms had acquired in earlier takeovers,
then these transactions can be viewed, in part, as 'undoing'
some of the unprofitable takeovers of the 1970s and early
1980s.2 °
Third, even diversification strategies that result in a decrease in
the acquirer's stock price may serve the economic interests of the
acquirer's shareholders. As indicated in Part II.C. of this Note,
Shleifer and Vishny argue that the conglomerate mergers of the
1970s furthered the interests of long- and short-term shareholders
of the acquiring firm.26 The resultant increase in efficiency from
the conglomerate mergers produced positive abnormal returns to
the benefit of short-term shareholders. Although abnormal returns
were negative in the long-term, Shleifer and Vishny argue that the
259. See THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS, supra note 7, at 249 ("Op-
dons will also enhance the profit incentive, and can make the managers more willing to
accept risk.").
260. OFFICE OF ECONoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 10.
261. See SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 3.
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acquirers' stock prices would have suffered greater declines in the
262
absence of these conglomerate acquisitions. -
Despite the fact that any managerial self-interest that may exist
when a company is acquiring a target fails to rise to the level of the
threat identified in Unocal, Hechler insists on the need for a more
intrusive standard of review for acquisition decisions. Hechler's
form of expanded judicial review would provide bidder company
shareholders with a cause of action to challenge a proposed or
completed merger or acquisition.6 3 For a proposed acquisition,
Hechler would allow bidder company shareholders to seek an in-
junction preventing the company's managers from completing the
proposed transaction.264 In the case of a completed transaction,
shareholders would be permitted to bring an action for money
damages, if the plaintiffs could show some loss resulting from the
acquisition.6 5 In either case, the plaintiffs would need to "plead a
prima facie case that managerial self-interest was a primary motiva-
tion behind the proposed or completed merger or acquisition,
which was in conflict with management's loyalty to shareholders. '6
The problems with Hechler's form of expanded judicial review
are readily apparent; indeed, Hechler herself recognizes her pro-
posal's shortcomings. The first problem, discussed earlier in Part I
of this Note, concerns the unproven connection between negative
abnormal returns and the wealth-maximizing effects of an acquisi-
tion. As Hechler readily admits, "market inefficiencies may make it
difficult for shareholders to show past or potential loss when chal-
lenging acquisitions."2 6 The lack of an established or accepted
connection between abnormal returns and the value of a particular
transaction would make assessing plaintiffs' losses extremely prob-
lematic. A similar problem will exist in cases where plaintiffs'
challenge an acquisition ex ante seeking injunctive relief. As previ-
ously stated, Hechler's proposal requires a prima facie showing of
managerial self-interest as the primary motivation behind a chal-
lenged acquisition. In the absence of direct evidence of such self-
interest, plaintiffs are likely to rely on circumstantial evidence as
proof of managerial self-interest. Such circumstantial evidence
would probably take the form of negative abnormal returns ex-
perienced by the bidder company's stock at some point
262. See id.
263. Hechler, supra note 7, at 386.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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surrounding the announcement of the acquisition. However, for
such evidence to have any probative value, one would have to as-
sume that the stock market "perfectly reflects" information
concerning a proposed transaction's wealth affects and that
'judges will be able to distinguish material declines from tempo-
rary noise in the stock markets.' '2 c8 Neither assumption is likely to
be true.
A more fundamental problem with Hechler's proposal for ex-
panded judicial review concerns the proposal's effects on the
corporate decision making process in general. In Unocal, where the
Delaware Supreme Court adopted a standard of review more intru-
sive than the business judgment rule, the judicial determination
required is relatively straight forward and simple. In Unocal-type
cases, a court is faced with a situation where the stock of a potential
target is trading at one price, a hostile bidder is offering a huge
premium to the target's shareholders and target management is
blocking the deal. In such cases, determining the propriety of tar-
get management's resistance to the deal requires a finding of fact
as to the value of the target's shares and determining whether the
hostile bid gives the target's shareholders the best price. Reviewing
a managerial decision to acquire a target, however, is not so simple.
Acquisition decisions made on the basis of expected synergy
gains and increases in the operating efficiency of the target em-
body time consuming, costly and complicated research and analysis
by the bidder company. In deciding whether to grant a group of
bidder company shareholders relief, a court would need to "fer-
ret[] out 'good' from 'bad' bidder managements." As Hechler
correctly observes: "on the target side, judges have not been terri-
bly keen in choosing between loyal and disloyal target managers."
As a result "[o] ne might wonder then, why judges would do such a
better job ferreting out "good" from "bad" bidder manage-
ments. 269 Additionally, any judicial efforts to engage in this
onerous and difficult task would "gut[] the business judgment rule
entirely."2 7 The business acumen and expertise of seasoned corpo-
rate managers would be replaced with what Black describes as the
271
"meager" business acumen ofjudges.
268. Id. at 387.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 385-86.
271. See Bidder Overpayment, supra note 7, at 651 (quoted in Hechler, supra note 7, at 386
n.197). Opining on the expanding the business judgment nile for acquisition decisions,
Bernard Black states:
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C. Liability Rule Protection
The next reform that Hechler suggests borrows from a protec-
tive measure for target shareholders proposed by Robert Daines
and Jon Hanson, and is known as a "liability rule" regime.2 7 2 Ulti-
mately, the liability regime amounts to nothing more than making
the acquirer's management insurers of the acquirer's stockholders.
Hechler's proposal would require that the managers of an acquir-
ing firm engage in what Hechler calls "acquisition bonding.",
73
That is, Hechler's liability regime would require the acquirer's
managers "to pay into an escrow account following the acquisition
an amount of money up to the point necessary to make the stock
move above the price it was trading at prior to the announcement
of the acquisition." 74
This proposal is problematic for a number of reasons. First,
Hechler's liability regime requires the acquirer's management to
pay into an escrow account an amount necessary to bring the price
of the acquirer's shares back to the pre-acquisition announcement
price. This requirement is based largely on two assumptions which
were addressed earlier in this Note. First, it assumes that the nega-
tive abnormal returns earned after an acquisition announcement is
made have enough probative value for managers to be held per-
sonally liable. This is questionable, as the investing public's
reaction to the announcement may not reflect an unbiased view.
Second, the requirement relies entirely on the cumulative abnor-
mal return methodology's ability to demonstrate a clear
connection between the movement in the price of the acquirer's
stock and the acquisition announcement. As discussed earlier in
Part I, both assumptions may be incorrect. Even if it was possible to
definitively say that negative abnormal returns occurred as a result
of the investing public's reaction to an acquisition announcement,
it remains possible that enough members of the investing public
I would not change judges' reluctance, embodied in the business judgment rule, to
second-guess takeover bids and other investment decisions. The costs of litigation are
too high, and the business acumen of judges too meager, to make it likely that the
benefits of greaterjudicial scrutiny will outweigh the costs.
Id.
272. Hechler, supra note 7, at 390 (citing Robert M. Daines &Jon D. Hanson, The Corpo-
rate Law Paradox: The Casefor Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577 (1992)).
273. Id. at 392.
274. Id.
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overreacted hat, in the aggregate, public sentiment did not pro-
duce an equilibrium price for the acquirer's stock post-
announcement.2
75
Finally, as stated above, applying the liability rule regime to cor-
porate acquisitions reduces managers to insurers of the firm's
stockholders. This is troublesome for two reasons. First, due to the
corporation's separation of ownership from management, investors
purchase equity positions in corporations fully aware of the risk of
mismanagement.176 Moreover, because the possibility that managers
will engage in imprudent acquisitions is reflected in the price of
the acquirer's stock,2" and because many stockholders are able to
eliminate company specific risk through diversification, using the
liability regime, where the acquisition decision falls short of "an
intentional infliction of loss" would give acquirer shareholders a
windfall.27 s
In short, the liability rule regime will result in an externality: due
to the liability rule regime's compensation scheme, shareholders
will not take into account the costs of managerial negligence asso-
ciated with the purchase of stock in a corporation. This resultant
externality will prevent capital from being allocated to corpora-
tions in accordance with investor valuations. 279 Hence, the liability
rule regime provides bidder firm shareholders with a windfall at
the expense of overall economic efficiency.
D. Auction Reform
Hechler also suggests auction reform as a potential protective
measure for bidder shareholders..28  Hechler asserts that the auc-
tion process, by its very nature, results in bidder overpayment.
Hechler seeks to modify the auction process in such a way as to de-
crease bidder overpayment, while simultaneously avoiding the
underpayment for targets.2 1 Hechler's first suggestion is to limit
275. See Freund & Easton, supra note 93, and accompanying text.
276. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 886.
277. See supra note 83, and accompanying text.
278. See Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders, supra note 116, at 437 (stating
that the intentional infliction of harm is different, because it cannot be protected against by
diversification).
279. See S.E. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD, GOVERNMENT, MARKETS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 67 (1985).
280. Hechler, supra note 7, at 393.
281. Id. at 394.
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the number of bidder allowed to participate in a target's auction.
However, she is forced to note that limiting the number of bidders
allowed to participate in an auction would exclude some bidders
with unique synergies with a target resulting in an inefficient allo-
cation of resources.82 Alternatively, by preventing all willing
participants from taking part in a target's auction, Hechler's pro-
posal would have a prohibitive effect on the market for corporate
control, the purpose of which is replace the target's inefficient
management with management that is able to make the most effi-
cient use of the target's resources. When the number of auction
participants is limited, the acquirer who is able to make the most
efficient use of the target's resources may be excluded. An auction
limited in such a way would result in the acquisition of the target
by an acquirer who, while able to increase efficiency beyond the
level of incumbent management, will not make the most efficient
use of the target's resources.
Hechler also suggests that bidder shareholders will be better off
if the uncertainty of the target's value is eliminated. To achieve
this, Hechler proposes the elimination of sealed bids in the auction284
process. However, this may create legal problems for the target
company. Once a target engages in a transaction that will result in
a change in corporate control or a break-up of the corporate en-
tity, the target's management is obligated to seek the best value
reasonably available to its shareholders.28 5 Any perceived bias could
result in a finding that the target's management breached its fidu-
ciary duty to its shareholders. In Paramount v. QVC, for example,
the Delaware Supreme Court found that Paramount's directors
failed to seek the best value reasonably available to its shareholders
when favorable treatment was extended to one auction bidder at
the expense of another.26 As a result of the holding in Paramount v.
QVC, directors may feel obligated to use sealed bids to minimize
their liability to shareholders based on allegations of disparate
treatment of competing bidders. Hechler's proposal, therefore,
should focus on loosening the judicially created protections af-
forded target shareholders during the auction process. Without
282. See id.
283. See generally, Mitchell & Lehn, supra note 73 (arguing that a motive for corporate
takeovers is to discipline managers who operate their firms in ways that do not maximize
profits).
284. Hechler, supra note 7, at 394.
285. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1993).
286. See id.
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the threat of a shareholder suit looming over the heads of target
management, the use of sealed bids may very well fall out of favor.
CONCLUSION
The timing and characteristics of the next wave of mergers and
acquisitions remain uncertain. However, the next epidemic of
mergers and acquisitions will present the same host of legal prob-
lems that the courts have struggled with over the last three
decades. Due to the increasing focus on the effects that corporate
acquisitions have on bidder shareholder returns, judicial analysis
will focus more on protecting the interests of bidder shareholders.
No one would deny that the acquisition decisions of manage-
ment should be subject to some form ofjudicial review. The power
of management to purchase targets, like any other power assigned
to corporate managers, may be used to further the interests of
management to the detriment of the firm's shareholders. The ex-
isting legal regime, however, adequately protects the interests of
bidder shareholders while simultaneously allowing managers to
engage in the day-to-day operations of the firm. The substantive
and procedural arms of management's obligation to act with due
care shape the corporate investment decision making process.
Moreover, market mechanisms, interstate competition, and federal
securities laws provide additional protections for bidder share-
holders.
When managers use company assets to acquire a target, the
business judgment rule obligates them to make only those acquisi-
tions that hold out the prospect of at least a market rate of return.
Acquisitions promising anything less would expose management to
shareholder liability on the basis that the acquisition decision
lacked substantive due care, because shareholders could have done
better for themselves by investing dividends in the market. Addi-
tionally, shareholders have the option of suing management based
on allegations that management did not inform itself of all mate-
rial information and, as a result, unjustifiably believed that an
acquisition would produce a market rate of return. Management
should, of course, be allowed to challenge both allegations. After-
the-fact litigation is an execrable way to review corporate invest-
ment decisions, which by their very nature are made under
uncertainty. Using uncertain methodologies and theories such as
the cumulative abnormal returns method and the efficient capital
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markets hypothesis as triggers for managerial strict liability would
have a chilling effect on managerial decision making and the mar-
ket for corporate control.
